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Medical Forum / General / General / January 2005

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university researchers give control to drug companies

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zwalanga@yahoo.com - 16 Jan 2005 23:58 GMT
"Academic experts have stood by while companies kept unsuccessful
results from the public. "Money," {Drummond} Rennie said. "Money for
yourself, money for your unit, money for all the people you employ on
other research, money for travel. Money is a very, very powerful
influence here."

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The Star-Telegram obtained copies of e-mails that offer a glimpse into
how university researchers sometimes negotiate content with drug
companies. The names are being withheld to protect the identity of the
newspaper's source.
{see below}

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

A Shadow Of Doubt

Medical schools give too much control to drug firms when testing
medications, critics say

By Mark Horvit

Star-Telegram Staff Writer

The studies had all the right credentials.

Their lead authors were prominent academicians. The research was
conducted at respected medical schools, including two in Texas.

They came to the same conclusion: New antidepressants are safe and
effective for children and teen-agers.

Doctors prescribe millions of the pills, which parents give to their
children. It hasn't gone well for some of them. While many doctors say
children in their care are helped, there have been reports of suicide
attempts and other violent acts blamed on the pills.

Whether the drugs are responsible remains a point of contention, as
does the question of how much they help those younger than 18.

But there's little question that studies conducted at universities that
could cast doubt on the popular pills were shelved, while favorable
results were promoted.

In the past few months, hard questions have been raised about some
top-selling drugs. The roles of federal regulators and big
pharmaceutical companies have come under heavy scrutiny.

But some are also asking whether academic medical centers do enough to
prevent themselves from being used as marketing tools by one of the
world's most profitable industries. Among the concerns:

· By setting the rules by which the drug studies are conducted,
companies can stack the deck on the outcome.

· Research for a single study is usually spread among many academic
institutions, and companies may limit, delay or prohibit individual
researchers' access to the overall results.

· University researchers put their names on journal articles for
which they haven't seen all the results or which company employees had
a heavy hand in writing.

· Academic experts have stood by while companies kept unsuccessful
results from the public.

A simple motivation can give companies the upper hand, said Dr.
Drummond Rennie, deputy editor for the Journal of the American Medical
Association.

"Money," Rennie said. "Money for yourself, money for your unit, money
for all the people you employ on other research, money for travel.
Money is a very, very powerful influence here."

Texas public medical schools and other academic institutions received
more than $200 million in research funding from pharmaceutical and
biotech companies between 2001 and 2003, according to an examination by
the Star-Telegram. Some researchers who conduct those studies have
pulled in tens of thousands of dollars a year in consulting contracts
and speaking fees from the same companies.

University officials say that the money is only a small percentage of
their overall research funding -- which was close to $3 billion in that
three-year period -- and that academicians bring objectivity and
oversight to the studies. Industry officials say that the federal Food
and Drug Administration oversees many facets of the process and that
academic experts can play significant roles in shaping the research.

"The argument that we're doing things and conducting trials on our own
is really wrong," said Alan Goldhammer, a vice president for
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.

Many universities have strengthened their hand in working with drug
companies, said Dr. David Korn of the Association of American Medical
Colleges. But institutions still sometimes cede too much control, he
said.

"They are supposed to stand for objectivity and dispassion and
accurate, high-quality science and accurate reporting of science," said
Korn, of the association's research division.

"And I think they can't have it both ways. If they're going to stand
for that reputation, then they can't be trading it away for research
contracts from drug companies."

Mixed results

Even before the debate on the safety of antidepressants for children
and teens made headlines last summer, FDA reviews were coming to an
important conclusion about the drug studies:

Most failed to prove the medications work.

But doctors usually had no way to know that. Instead, they heard about
successful studies trumpeted in respected journals. Those articles
featured the names of top university researchers -- some of whom had
also been involved in unsuccessful trials that weren't seeing the light
of day.

Consider how Paxil, one of the new-generation antidepressants, was
tested in children and teens.

Three large clinical trials were funded by GlaxoSmithKline, or GSK, the
maker of Paxil. Researchers at numerous universities participated.

In the first trial, the drug failed to meet the main goal researchers
had set to measure its effectiveness. But because it met some secondary
goals, researchers -- including two from Texas schools -- deemed it
effective for adolescents, and an article was published in a major
medical journal.

The two other trials failed to show that Paxil, when tested against a
placebo, or sugar pill, was effective. Neither has been published.

An internal GSK memo shows how the company handled such mixed results.
An employee discusses the need "to effectively manage the dissemination
of these data in order to minimize any potential negative commercial
impact." The document, obtained by the New York attorney general for a
lawsuit, also says "it would be commercially unacceptable" for GSK to
state that Paxil's effectiveness had not been proved.

But when an FDA reviewer looked at the Paxil trials together, that's
exactly what he determined.

It's also the way one of the published study's authors now portrays
those results. Despite her previous conclusion, Dr. Karen Wagner of the
University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston told a group of
psychiatrists at a meeting last week that all three Paxil trials proved
unsuccessful. Wagner declined to comment after her presentation.

The Paxil pattern held true with other antidepressants that hit the
market in the 1990s. Four of the drugs had what researchers considered
positive results in treating depression in minors, and the studies were
published. There were at least eight unsuccessful trials, and one
researcher involved with several said none of those results have been
published.

So even though the FDA had not approved use of the antidepressants,
other than Prozac, for anyone younger than 18, the literature only gave
the impression of growing evidence that the drugs work.

"Perhaps the preponderance of failed trials in depression might have
dampened some of the enthusiasm for these drugs, had that information
been publicly available, but that is of course speculation," FDA
epidemiologist Andrew Mosholder wrote in response to Star-Telegram
questions. Mosholder re-viewed many of the drugs, both for
effectiveness and safety.

Dr. Graham Emslie, a child psychiatrist at the University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, took part in several
antidepressant studies, including two Paxil trials -- the one deemed a
success, and one that wasn't.

It's important to understand, Emslie said, that an unsuccessful trial
doesn't necessarily mean a drug doesn't work. Instead, the failure may
indicate that the test was poorly designed, so the results may not be
scientifically valid.

For example, Emslie believes many of the antidepressant trials failed
because they were modeled on adult usage, so dosages were wrong. Emslie
and numerous other psychiatrists say the drugs work for their patients.

Still, he said he's uncomfortable with the way some unsuccessful trials
in which he participated have not been publicized. Recently, he
presented data from one at a conference, and articles on two have been
submitted for publication. While he said working with the companies
delayed the process, Emslie conceded that he and other researchers
often don't push as hard to publish unsuccessful results as they do
their successes.

Others are uncomfortable with how companies may limit researchers'
access to results -- even when benefiting from their expertise and
reputation.

Most major medical centers -- including those in Texas -- demand
publishing rights for the data they gather for drug company trials.

But trials usually take place at multiple sites, and officials at one
institution cannot typically demand results gathered at others. With
only their own information, they usually cannot draw scientifically
valid conclusions.

Emslie, who like many top researchers has been a paid consultant and
speaker for several drug companies, including GSK, said there's at
least one company he likely won't work with again because it refused to
share data with him and other researchers.

Schools can also be hamstrung because they sign contracts giving
companies a period of exclusive use of the research results. At some
Texas medical schools, the delay is as long as two years. That is meant
to give the company time to gather and analyze data and coordinate any
published articles. But two years is too long, said Korn and others.

Several Texas university officials said they are not aware of many
instances when researchers have had problems getting data.

An attorney with the University of Texas System -- which oversees
several medical schools -- said that in eight years, she has received
only one such complaint.

In that recent case, the UT researcher and counterparts at other
participating schools banded together to get data after the company
halted a trial, BethLynn Maxwell said.

Although they were initially denied, the company has agreed to
cooperate, she said.

Nationally, schools' failure to require full and timely access to data
is one of the major holes in the academic oversight system, Korn said.

While, as a practical matter, many schools cannot handle the mountains
of data generated in multicenter studies, he said, they should demand
the access they need if a study is to be published with their names
attached.

"If the company handles the data, what you get is what the company
gives you, which may not be a perfectly accurate reflection," Korn
said.

Concerns arise

As more studies touted new antidepressants and more kids began taking
them, some doctors grew concerned.

The drugs lack some of the debilitating side effects of older
antidepressants; that's their primary selling point. But they carry
their own potentially serious health risks for some patients, including
diabetes and reports of complications associated with withdrawal.

Most troubling to some, there are indications that a small percentage
of children were becoming agitated or suicidal.

Mosholder, the FDA researcher, examined all trials of new-generation
antidepressants involving children and teens. Although no trial
participant committed suicide, Mosholder found that almost 3 percent
showed signs of suicidal thoughts or behavior, about twice the
percentage of those not taking the drugs.

His findings led the FDA last year to require a prominent "black box"
warning on the drugs' packaging, despite some doctors' concerns that
the drugs are being unfairly blamed and patients who need them will be
scared away.

For the trend to be evident, Mosholder said, it was necessary to look
at all the study results combined, including unpublished trials.

To win FDA approval for a new drug, a company has to show that the
medication is safe and effective. But companies can set the ground
rules for researchers.

Drug companies don't typically design clinical trials to identify
uncommon risks, said Dr. Michael Fant of the University of Texas Health
Science Center at Houston, who served on the FDA advisory committee
that recommended the warning label. That could have been the case in
the antidepressant trials, he said.

"It certainly contributed to some of the limitations in terms of what
questions the studies could answer, because the studies are clearly
being designed just to achieve a certain standard, and that standard is
to get placed on the market," Fant said.

A shortcoming of many company-funded trials is that they pit their
medicine against only placebos. Trials pitting the test drug against
both a placebo and a competing pill that's known to work would be more
telling, Emslie said.

But such studies could show that a competitor's product is superior, he
said.

The FDA has raised concerns about how some companies design their
trials.

In one study, a company pitted its new heartburn medication against a
generic drug. But the new pill was prescribed in a dosage twice as
strong as the generic, according to a senior FDA official.

Not surprisingly, the new drug worked better than the older, cheaper
one.

Another study the FDA took issue with involved the antidepressant
Zoloft.

Wagner, a child-psychiatry expert, was lead author of the study, which
supported the use of Zoloft for children with major depression.

The authors reached their conclusion by combining two separate but
identically designed studies, neither of which succeeded on its own.

The problem, FDA officials determined, was deciding after the studies
began to combine the results. Goals are supposed to be set before the
outcome is known.

Pfizer officials declined to comment about the studies. But in written
testimony to a congressional committee examining the studies, a company
official said the decision to combine data was made before the trials
ended and results were known.

Wagner, who also took part in the published Paxil study and who has
done consulting work for numerous drug companies, including Pfizer, did
not respond to written questions from the Star-Telegram about specific
studies.

Critics say that companies have too much power in the process and that
their financial ties to some researchers increase their influence.
Officials at several universities said that, on the contrary, the
independence of their clinicians brings an objective eye to the design
and other crucial aspects of company-funded studies.

When companies bypass academic institutions -- which has occurred with
increasing frequency in recent years -- there may be far less scrutiny,
said Perrie Adams, associate dean for research and a psychiatry
professor at UT Southwestern.

Adams said schools have multiple safeguards intended to maintain high
standards. Among them are institutional review boards, which must
approve all research plans before studies can be done.

Those boards, which may review hundreds of studies a year, are designed
primarily to protect the safety of patients in the trials. Part of
their role involves examining the study design, Adams said, to weigh
potential benefits against any risk.

Question of authorship

In spring 2003, doctors got a special supplement with a medical journal
in their mailboxes.

The publication was all about Paxil. Its 15 articles covered topics
including the drug's success at treating depression, anxiety and
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Not one focused exclusively on negative
side effects or other shortcomings.

GlaxoSmithKline paid for it through an "unrestricted grant," implying
the company didn't control content. And the funding source was
explained in multiple disclaimers.

But the bold print went to the authors: respected researchers from some
of America's better medical schools.

Supplements like this are an extreme example of the confluence of
marketing and academia.

When a drug company is involved in a published study, university
researchers are often listed as the primary authors -- the ones most
responsible for the content -- with company scientists receiving second
billing. But many times the company writes the bulk of an article.

"I think very few people these days who seem to be the authors of
trials can in any meaningful way be said to have run the trial," said
Dr. David Healy, a psychiatry professor at Cardiff University in Wales
and an outspoken critic of drug companies' antidepressant research.

"It used to be, I'd draw up the protocol, get the patients, run the
trial. Now, maybe I've been involved in meetings, seen and approved a
pharmaceutical-company-written trial," he said. "I won't get to see the
raw data at all. But I may be the first author on the paper."

Marketing can shade the content of some articles, critics say, even
when the paper appears in a scholarly journal.

The Star-Telegram obtained copies of e-mails that offer a glimpse into
how university researchers sometimes negotiate content with drug
companies. The names are being withheld to protect the identity of the
newspaper's source.

A researcher at a Texas medical school had questions about an article
for which the researcher would be listed as lead author. It reported
favorable results when testing a bestselling medication for a new use.

The researcher asked whether the weight gained by patients using the
drug -- a known risk with such medication -- should be considered
significant.

A company official responded, "Obviously, from a marketing perspective,
I hope we can avoid making this statement."

Ultimately, the published article terms the weight gain statistically
significant.

When the researcher's office asked whether to expound on information
about another side effect, a company employee said that was
unnecessary.

"We do not want to remove the focus from efficacy in the manuscript,"
the employee wrote.

Rennie, of the Journal of the American Medical Association, said he
doesn't understand why researchers participate in studies where the
drug company can heavily influence content.

"It's like saying, 'I totally trust the drug company to be
disinterested in how it publishes the results,' " he said. "To which I
would say, 'You've got to be joking.' "

How much difference does it make when work is funded by drug companies
rather than an independent source?

Dr. John Montgomery, assistant professor of psychiatry at the
University of Mississippi Medical Center, and several researchers at UT
Southwestern reviewed every article about new-generation antipsychotic
drugs up through March 2002. Their conclusion echoes the findings of a
growing body of research.

When published studies are sponsored by drug companies, they usually
come to the same conclusion: The medicine works.

Montgomery said his study did not find major differences in the quality
of the studies, regardless of sponsorship. However, he said there are
other ways bias can creep in.

He pointed to one study comparing Risperdal and Zyprexa -- newer
antipsychotic drugs. The dosage of Risperdal was so high that it
virtually guaranteed significant negative side effects, Montgomery
said. The maker of Zyprexa paid for the study.

"That's just one example of how they kind of stack the odds," he said.

Proposals for change

Even most critics agree there's a need for medical schools to work with
drug companies. The reality is that only the companies -- which have
the most to gain -- are going to put up the millions of dollars
necessary.

And medical school researchers -- and their patients -- have much to
gain from participating in trials with cutting-edge medications, school
officials say.

Academic researchers could benefit from several proposed improvements.

Chief among those is an effort in Congress, supported by many
educators, to require all clinical trials to be publicly registered at
inception, before results are known. A federal registry exists, but it
is far from complete.

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America is creating a
voluntary registry where drug companies have agreed to report study
findings, regardless of outcome, said Goldhammer, a vice president for
the organization. Relatively little has been posted so far, but
Goldhammer said companies have until later this year to act.

Some companies are working on their own disclosure programs. GSK is
building an Internet database listing results from all clinical trials,
even failed ones, on products the company sells, spokesman Rick Koenig
said.

But critics say voluntary industry-operated registries won't work.

Wagner said through a spokeswoman at UT Medical Branch at Galveston
that she supports creating a national registry, as well as other
safeguards "that will make the research process more transparent and
safer without compromising the ability of scientists to do the work
that leads to advances in health care."

Korn said his association and others plan to work on a set of
principles and guidelines that universities should follow when
conducting industry-sponsored research. He said it's up to the schools
to become more demanding, such as insisting on timelier access to all
the data. But he knows that will be a tough sell to drug companies.

"The companies will tell you they paid for the study and they own all
the data and they can do what they want with it," Korn said.

Some industry critics say the system's flaws are too fundamental to be
easily repaired.

There was once a clearer separation between industry researchers and
their university counterparts, said Vera Hassner Sharav, who heads the
drug industry watchdog group Alliance for Human Research Protection.
The industry looked to university researchers as a "credibility bridge"
to bring validity to studies, she said.

"But it turns out they're really partners," she said. "Once you have a
scientist and the institution in partnership with industry, you've
broken the fire wall that existed."

IN THE KNOW

Industry research funding

Texas academic medical centers received the following in research
grants from pharmaceutical and biotech companies between 2001 and 2003:

· University of Texas    $107.8 million M.D. Anderson Cancer Center
· University of Texas    $27.8 million Health Science Center at San
Antonio
· University of Texas    $27.4 million Health Science Center at Houston
· University of Texas    $22 million Medical Branch at Galveston
· University of Texas    $16.5 million Southwestern Medical Center at
Dallas
· Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center    $8.1 million
· University of Texas Health Center at Tyler    $3.2 million
· University of North Texas Health Science Center    $2.2 million
· Texas A&M University System Health Science Center    $1.1 million
TOTAL    $216.1 million

· The total represents about 8 percent of all research dollars
reported. The bulk of research funding comes from the federal
government.

· An additional $34 million in donations was reported by five
schools, with UT Southwestern accounting for $21 million of that.

· Some schools did not report a full three years' worth of data, and
in some cases fiscal years are represented instead of calendar years.
The figures reflect grant money awarded, not necessarily the amount
spent.

SOURCES: The institutions, Star-Telegram analysis
Mark Horvit, (817) 390-7087 mhorvit@star-telegram.com
Herman Rubin - 18 Jan 2005 20:37 GMT
>"Academic experts have stood by while companies kept unsuccessful
>results from the public. "Money," {Drummond} Rennie said. "Money for
>yourself, money for your unit, money for all the people you employ on
>other research, money for travel. Money is a very, very powerful
>influence here."

THIS should be made a major felony.  I have consistently
maintained that a manufacturer needs to give ALL the
information about the product, including the adverse
information, and this should protect from liability.

BTW, while this cannot be done, negative studies should
be published.  The use of meta-analysis when this is not
done is invalid, and this is heavily done.  A fair number
of current medical advice is based upon this misuse of
statistics.

Signature

This address is for information only.  I do not claim that these views
are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University.
Herman Rubin, Department of Statistics, Purdue University
hrubin@stat.purdue.edu         Phone: (765)494-6054   FAX: (765)494-0558

Zee - 19 Jan 2005 00:33 GMT
> >"Academic experts have stood by while companies kept unsuccessful
> >results from the public. "Money," {Drummond} Rennie said. "Money for
[quoted text clipped - 18 lines]
> Herman Rubin, Department of Statistics, Purdue University
> hrubin@stat.purdue.edu         Phone: (765)494-6054   FAX: (765)494-0558

Hired Education
A hidden culprit in the drug scandals: the increasingly corporatized
university.

http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId46

By Jennifer Washburn
Issue Date: 02.04.05

Print Friendly | Email Article

M. Michael Wolfe, a gastroenterologist at Boston University, admits he
was duped by the Pharmacia Corporation, the manufacturer of the
blockbuster arthritis drug Celebrex. (In 2003, the company was
purchased by Pzer.) In the summer of 2000, The Journal of the
American Medical Association asked Wolfe to write a review of a study
showing that Celebrex was associated with lower rates of stomach and
intestinal ulcers and other complications than two older arthritis
medications, diclofenac and ibuprofen. Wolfe found the study, tracking
8,000 patients over a six-month period, persuasive, and penned a
favorable review, which helped to drive up Celebrex sales.

But early the next year, while serving on the Food and Drug
Administrations (FDA) arthritis advisory committee, Wolfe had
occasion to review the same drug trial again, and was abbergasted by
what he saw. Pharmacias study had run for one year, not six months,
as the company had originally led both Wolfe and the Journal to
believe. When the complete data was considered, most of Celebrexs
advantages disappeared because the ulcer complications that occurred
during the second half of the study were disproportionately found in
patients taking Celebrex.

I am furious, Wolfe told The Washington Post in 2001. I looked
like a fool. But ... all I had available to me was the data presented
in the article. Remarkably, none of the Journal studys 16
authors, including eight university professors, had spoken out publicly
about this egregious suppression of negative data. All the authors were
either employees of Pharmacia or paid consultants of the company.

Celebrex, an anti-inammatory drug similar to Vioxx, is once again in
the news due to concerns that it may be associated with the same
cardiovascular risks that caused Vioxx to get yanked from the market.
In recent months, weve heard a great deal about conicts of
interest at both the FDA, the agency that approves drugs for public
safety, and the National Institutes of Health, where publicly funded
scientists moonlight as consultants for the very companies that
manufactured the drugs they are testing. Still largely ignored,
however, is the role played by the once-autonomous ivory tower and the
university scientists who, either knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate
the pharmaceutical industrys manipulation of drug testing by lending
it an aura of objectivity.

Today, market forces are dictating what is happening in the world of
higher education as never before, causing universities to look and
behave more and more like business enterprises. Instead of honoring
their traditional commitment to teaching, disinterested research, and
the broad dissemination of knowledge, universities are aggressively
striving to become research arms of private industry. Faced with
declining government funding, they are avidly seeking to enhance their
role as engines of economic growth, promising state legislators
and governors that they will help drive regional economic development
by pumping out commercially valuable inventions.

This radical redenition of the universitys mission can be traced
back to the economic stagnation of the 1970s. Propelled by heightened
competition from Germany and Japan, Congress passed landmark
legislation in 1980 that allowed universities to automatically retain
the rights to intellectual property stemming from taxpayer-nanced
research. The intent of the legislation, popularly known as the
Bayh-Dole Act (its sponsors were Senators Birch Bayh and Bob Dole), was
to stimulate innovation and speed the transfer of federally nanced
research to industry. What it accomplished in the process was the
introduction of a dangerous new prot motive into the heart of the
university.

As a result, schools now routinely operate expensive patenting and
licensing operations to market their facultys inventions, extracting
royalty income and other fees in return. They invest their endowment
money in risky startup rms founded by their professors. They run
their own industrial parks and venture capital funds. They publish
newsletters encouraging faculty members to commercialize new research
by launching independent, faculty-owned companies. Star professors
consult for, or hold equity in, the same rms that manufacture the
drugs they are studying, while also often accepting generous fees to
join corporate advisory boards and speakers bureaus. Sometimes these
professors even hold the patent to the drug or device being tested. In
a study of 800 scientic papers published in leading journals of
medicine and molecular biology, Sheldon Krimsky, a professor of public
policy at Tufts University, found that slightly more than a third of
the lead authors based at research institutions in Massachusetts had a
signicant nancial interest in their own reports. So pervasive are
such ties that journal editors now frequently complain that they can no
longer nd academic experts who do not have a nancial interest in
a drug or therapy the journal would like to review.

Research suggests that publicly funded science, most of it performed at
universities, was a critical contributor to the discovery of nearly all
of the 25 most important breakthrough drugs introduced between 1970 and
1995. If university scientists lose their independence, who will
perform this pathbreaking research and objectively evaluate the safety
and effectiveness of drugs already on the market? Conicts of
interest are more than an academic concern. When it comes to health
policy, they pose a serious threat to public health.

* * *

With the possible exception of business schools, the nations medical
schools have been more inltrated by industry than any other sector
of the university. Pharmaceutical companies sponsor daily lunches for
medical students at which they market their latest drugs; they ply
professors with fancy dinners, gifts, luxurious trips, and free
prescriptions designed to inuence medical decisions and prescribing
habits. The drug industry also spends millions of dollars nancing
clinical drug research at the academy, but increasingly this money
comes with many more strings attached. After conducting a thorough
review of the medical literature for The New England Journal of
Medicine in 2000, Thomas Bodenheimer, an internist at the University of
California, San Francisco, concluded that academic investigators were
rapidly ceding to industry control over nearly every stage of the
clinical research process.

In the past, for example, it was common for university scientists to
initiate the research protocol. Now, studies are frequently conceived
and designed in the companys own pharmacological and marketing
departments, thus removing this formative stage of the research from
academic hands almost entirely. The company then shops the study around
to various academic institutions (and a growing number of competing
for-prot subcontractors that run clinical trials) in search of
investigators to conduct the research. As university medical schools
have grown more dependent on industry grants to sustain their
operations, their professors have become increasingly willing to accept
an industry-initiated protocol without modication, even though the
study may be largely designed to secure a companys market position.
Should a professor reject the study or insist on changes, another
university scientist will very likely be more solicitous.

Industry also encourages the use of ghostwriters on scientic papers.
This means an article or review bylined by a prominent academic might
in fact have been written by a medical-communications company working
for the drugmaker, with the author paid an honorarium to attach
his or her name to it. When Wyeth-Ayerst sought to boost market demand
for Redux, one part of the once highly popular fen-phen diet-drug
combination, the company hired a company called Excerpta Medica to help
draft the manuscripts and pay doctors to review and sign the articles.
One of the many doctors who signed Excerptas papers was Richard
Atkinson, a renowned obesity expert at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. Atkinson denied having any knowledge of Excerptas
connection to Wyeth, but as an independent academic, he nonetheless
agreed to lend his name to a company he apparently knew little about.
(Excerpta maintains that all its authors were told of the companys
association with the manufacturer.) In a deposition on January 15,
1999, Wyeth-Ayerst executive Jo Alene Dolan admitted that her company
had written the article for Atkinson, stressing that all drug companies
ghostwrite articles. Shortly before the article could be published,
Redux was pulled from the market because of its association with
serious heart and lung problems.

Scientists who perform industry-sponsored research are also asked
routinely to sign legal contracts requiring them to keep both the
methods and the results of their work secret for a period of time.
Research conducted by David Blumenthal and Eric Campbell, health-policy
researchers at Harvard University, suggests that data withholding and
publication delays have become far more common over the last 25 years,
particularly in molecular biology, medicine, and other life-science
disciplines, where commercial relationships have grown dramatically in
recent years. In a survey of 2,167 life-science faculty, Blumenthal
found that nearly one in ve of them had delayed publication for more
than six months to protect proprietary information.

Industry also manipulates academic research by suppressing negative
studies altogether. Recently, it came to light that a whole class of
popular antidepressants -- including such heavily prescribed drugs as
Paxil, Zoloft, and Prozac -- are largely ineffectual in treating
childhood depression and actually increase the risk of suicide. One of
the main reasons this information was not available to doctors and the
broader public, it turns out, is that the academic investigators who
led these studies either allowed industry to bury their research or
were complicit in downplaying negative ndings in their own published
papers. How prevalent is such corporate meddling? The question has
received surprisingly little scholarly attention, but what research
does exist is not encouraging. One survey of major university-industry
research centers in the eld of engineering, for example, found that
35 percent would allow corporate sponsors to delete information from
papers prior to publication.

* * *

But all the blame for the eroding objectivity of university researchers
does not rest with industry. Universities themselves are complicit:
They are so nancially invested in their professors research
through patents, equity, and other nancial holdings that their
disinterested pursuit of knowledge has been gravely compromised. For
instance, when the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis longtime
director, Professor John D. Graham, was nominated by President George
W. Bush to become the governments regulatory czar at the
Ofce of Information and Regulatory Affairs (part of the Ofce of
Management and Budget), it helped to expose just how extensive
Harvards nancial conicts really were. Congressional hearings
revealed that Grahams center solicited tobacco money and worked with
the tobacco industry to disparage the risks of secondhand smoke.
(Harvey Fineberg, a dean at the Harvard School of Public Health,
demanded that one check from Philip Morris be returned. In response,
Graham wrote to the company asking if it might send the $25,000 back to
the Harvard center via the Philip Morris subsidiary Kraft Foods
instead.) Grahams center also argued that cell-phone use by drivers
should not be restricted, even though its own research, which was
funded by AT&T Wireless Communications, showed that such use could lead
to a thousand additional highway deaths a year. As a member of the
Environmental Protection Agencys scientic advisory board
subcommittee on dioxin, a known human carcinogen, Graham argued that
reducing dioxin levels might do more harm  than good. His
Harvard center, meanwhile, was heavily funded by dioxin producers.

Worse yet, the universities loyalties are now so conicted that
schools are increasingly willing to cave in to narrow commercial
demands rather than defend their own professors academic freedom or
the public interest. When researchers at the University of Utah
discovered an important human gene responsible for hereditary breast
cancer, for example, they didnt make it freely available to other
scientists, even though we -- the U.S. taxpayers -- paid $4.6 million
to nance the research. The university raced to patent it, then
granted the monopoly rights to Myriad Genetics Inc., a startup company
founded by a University of Utah professor, which proceeded to hoard the
gene and prevent other academic scientists from using it.

Professors, too, are increasingly driven by the bottom line. More and
more, they not only accept industry grants to support their research
but also hold stock in or have other nancial ties to the companies
funding them. Many experts fear this skewing of professors research
toward short-term commercial goals will impede long-term scientic
and technological innovation. Financial entanglements between
researchers and corporations have grown so common that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has investigated numerous academic
researchers suspected of engaging in insider trading. In a case led
in Pennsylvania, the SEC charged Dale J. Lange, a Columbia University
neurologist, with pocketing $26,000 in prots after Lange bought
stock in a company that was about to release promising new ndings
concerning a drug to treat Lou Gehrigs disease. Lange had good
reason to expect the stock to soar because he had conducted the
condential clinical trials himself. In 2000, an investigation by USA
Today found that more than half the experts hired to advise the U.S.
government on the safety and effectiveness of drugs -- a large number
of whom are academics -- now have nancial links to companies that
will be affected by their conclusions.

When Wyeth-Ayerst was trying to get its diet drug, Redux, approved for
sale in the United States, for example, it faced a serious hurdle:
Patients in Europe who had taken a drug virtually identical to Redux
had an increased chance of getting a rare, life-threatening lung
ailment known as pulmonary hypertension. To combat this negative health
prole, the company packed an FDA hearing room with a whos who
list of the nations top academic obesity experts, all of whom were
also paid consultants to Wyeth-Ayerst or other companies involved in
the sale of Redux. In addition, the company recruited expert opinion
leaders, such as George Blackburn, a renowned obesity expert at
Harvard, to testify before the Medical Society of Massachusetts for
approval of the drug. Blackburn and other academic luminaries further
participated in the companys Visiting Important Professors
Program and were paid thousands of dollars in honoraria to y to
fancy resorts and promote Redux at medical conferences. Not
surprisingly, the drug handily won market approval, and prescriptions
in the United States began to soar.

Soon, however, evidence of the drugs association with lung damage
surfaced once again, and the company turned to leading university
scientists to do damage control. In the summer of 1996, an internal
company memo revealed that the company was planning to spend $5.8
million to pay for more university-based studies, noting that that
money was needed to establish and maintain relationships with
opinion leaders at the local and national level to communicate to their
colleagues the benets of Redux and to encourage its use. Among
the many doctors willing to heed the companys call was Atkinson, the
obesity expert at the University of Wisconsin, whose name appeared on a
company-authored article. Let me congratulate you and your
writer, wrote Atkinson in a thank-you letter to the ghostwriting
rm that was one of numerous company documents that became public
during subsequent legal proceedings. Perhaps I can get you to write
all my papers for me!

* * *

So how does this growing web of academic-industry ties affect research
outcomes? A vast body of work suggests that industry-funded research is
far from impartial. In 1996, Stanford researcher Mildred Cho
co-authored a study in the Annals of Internal Medicine that found that
98 percent of papers based on industry-sponsored research reected
favorably on the drugs being examined, compared with 79 percent of
papers based on research not funded by industry. An analysis published
in The Journal of the American Medical Association in 1999 found that
studies of cancer drugs funded by the pharmaceutical industry were
nearly eight times less likely to reach unfavorable conclusions than
similar studies funded by nonprot organizations. More recently, a
systematic review of 1,140 clinical trial studies, published by
researchers at Yale in 2003, concluded that, from cancer to arthritis
to cholesterol, the evidence is overwhelming that when research is
industry-sponsored, it is signicantly more likely to reach
conclusions that [are] favorable to the sponsor than
nonindustry-funded research.

In the area of health and drug research, of course, the results of such
manipulation can be deadly. Running down the list of drugs recently
pulled from the market or subject to increased health warnings --
Rezulin, the diabetes drug; Redux (or fen-phen), the diet drug;
Retin-A, the anti-wrinkle cream; Neurontin, the epilepsy drug; Paxil,
Zoloft, and the many other antidepressants now deemed ineffective for
children -- one nds that a remarkable number of prominent university
professors with close nancial ties to the manufacturers played a
central role in lobbying for these drugs to be approved, recommending
them to other doctors, and, in many cases, urging that they remain on
the market long after the problems or lack of effectiveness became
known. Not infrequently, the university scientists who shill for the
drug companies most aggressively are also the biggest-name professors
in their elds.

Universities have gone out of their way to assure the public that their
clinical trials meet the highest standards of scientic
excellence and academic rigor. But over the last 20 years,
public dismay over the growing nancial entanglements in clinical
research has prompted the federal government to impose tougher
conict-of-interest regulations, only to encounter erce university
opposition. In 1995, the federal government nally succeeded in
pushing through rules that would apply to all academic researchers
funded by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) or the
National Science Foundation (NSF). But the rules, which remain in place
today, were not tough enough to be effective. Although they mandate
that serious conicts of interest must be managed and/or eliminated,
they leave the determination of what action is to be taken, if any,
entirely up to the university. The policy also doesnt provide any
guidance on which conicts warrant serious attention, nor does it
impose any prohibitions, such as banning nancial conicts outright
in the area of human-subject research. Signicantly, the policy also
says nothing about institutional conicts of interest.

The result, not surprisingly, is that university conict-of-interest
rules vary widely. One comprehensive 2000 survey of the written
policies at 100 academic institutions found that only 55 percent of
schools required disclosure of conicts of interest from all faculty,
and only 19 percent specied any limits on researchers nancial
ties to corporate sponsors. Worse yet, under this fragmented system,
there is enormous pressure on universities to keep their policies lax.
Schools with tighter restrictions run the risk of losing talented
faculty to competing schools with more permissive policies, where the
nancial rewards and commercial prospects are likely to be greater.

Another conspicuous problem with the HHS/NSF policy is that it does not
require universities to make any of the information they compile on
faculty nancial conicts available to the public. Many academic
journals do require their authors to disclose corporate nancial
ties. But in practice, reporting is astonishingly poor. In a 2001
study, Tufts Krimsky found that a mere 0.5 percent of the 61,134
papers appearing in 181 peer-reviewed journals contained statements
about the authors nancial ties. More recent studies have found
similarly low levels of reporting.

In some respects, the whole debate reects how far the academic world
remains from dealing seriously with the issue; disclosure of potential
conicts of interest is, after all, a far cry from eliminating them
outright, as many professions not only recommend but also require. In
the legal profession, for example, attorneys are prohibited from taking
on cases in which they have a nancial interest or other explicit
conicts that might be seen to compromise their professional
integrity. The same is true of judges. But when it comes to academia,
neither the medical community nor the government (whether through
Congress or the regulatory agencies) has taken up the task, instead
proceeding under the assumption that universities can be trusted to
manage these commercial interactions themselves. Its a nice idea.
But are academic institutions really capable of performing this
function? There is good reason to be skeptical: Far from being
independent watchdogs capable of dispassionate inquiry, universities
are increasingly joined at the hip to the very market forces the public
has entrusted them to check, creating problems that extend far beyond
the research lab.

Adapted from the book University, Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of
Higher Education, by Jennifer Washburn. Copyright 2005.
 
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