Medical Forum / General / General / January 2005
university researchers give control to drug companies
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zwalanga@yahoo.com - 16 Jan 2005 23:58 GMT "Academic experts have stood by while companies kept unsuccessful results from the public. "Money," {Drummond} Rennie said. "Money for yourself, money for your unit, money for all the people you employ on other research, money for travel. Money is a very, very powerful influence here."
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The Star-Telegram obtained copies of e-mails that offer a glimpse into how university researchers sometimes negotiate content with drug companies. The names are being withheld to protect the identity of the newspaper's source. {see below}
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A Shadow Of Doubt
Medical schools give too much control to drug firms when testing medications, critics say
By Mark Horvit
Star-Telegram Staff Writer
The studies had all the right credentials.
Their lead authors were prominent academicians. The research was conducted at respected medical schools, including two in Texas.
They came to the same conclusion: New antidepressants are safe and effective for children and teen-agers.
Doctors prescribe millions of the pills, which parents give to their children. It hasn't gone well for some of them. While many doctors say children in their care are helped, there have been reports of suicide attempts and other violent acts blamed on the pills.
Whether the drugs are responsible remains a point of contention, as does the question of how much they help those younger than 18.
But there's little question that studies conducted at universities that could cast doubt on the popular pills were shelved, while favorable results were promoted.
In the past few months, hard questions have been raised about some top-selling drugs. The roles of federal regulators and big pharmaceutical companies have come under heavy scrutiny.
But some are also asking whether academic medical centers do enough to prevent themselves from being used as marketing tools by one of the world's most profitable industries. Among the concerns:
· By setting the rules by which the drug studies are conducted, companies can stack the deck on the outcome.
· Research for a single study is usually spread among many academic institutions, and companies may limit, delay or prohibit individual researchers' access to the overall results.
· University researchers put their names on journal articles for which they haven't seen all the results or which company employees had a heavy hand in writing.
· Academic experts have stood by while companies kept unsuccessful results from the public.
A simple motivation can give companies the upper hand, said Dr. Drummond Rennie, deputy editor for the Journal of the American Medical Association.
"Money," Rennie said. "Money for yourself, money for your unit, money for all the people you employ on other research, money for travel. Money is a very, very powerful influence here."
Texas public medical schools and other academic institutions received more than $200 million in research funding from pharmaceutical and biotech companies between 2001 and 2003, according to an examination by the Star-Telegram. Some researchers who conduct those studies have pulled in tens of thousands of dollars a year in consulting contracts and speaking fees from the same companies.
University officials say that the money is only a small percentage of their overall research funding -- which was close to $3 billion in that three-year period -- and that academicians bring objectivity and oversight to the studies. Industry officials say that the federal Food and Drug Administration oversees many facets of the process and that academic experts can play significant roles in shaping the research.
"The argument that we're doing things and conducting trials on our own is really wrong," said Alan Goldhammer, a vice president for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.
Many universities have strengthened their hand in working with drug companies, said Dr. David Korn of the Association of American Medical Colleges. But institutions still sometimes cede too much control, he said.
"They are supposed to stand for objectivity and dispassion and accurate, high-quality science and accurate reporting of science," said Korn, of the association's research division.
"And I think they can't have it both ways. If they're going to stand for that reputation, then they can't be trading it away for research contracts from drug companies."
Mixed results
Even before the debate on the safety of antidepressants for children and teens made headlines last summer, FDA reviews were coming to an important conclusion about the drug studies:
Most failed to prove the medications work.
But doctors usually had no way to know that. Instead, they heard about successful studies trumpeted in respected journals. Those articles featured the names of top university researchers -- some of whom had also been involved in unsuccessful trials that weren't seeing the light of day.
Consider how Paxil, one of the new-generation antidepressants, was tested in children and teens.
Three large clinical trials were funded by GlaxoSmithKline, or GSK, the maker of Paxil. Researchers at numerous universities participated.
In the first trial, the drug failed to meet the main goal researchers had set to measure its effectiveness. But because it met some secondary goals, researchers -- including two from Texas schools -- deemed it effective for adolescents, and an article was published in a major medical journal.
The two other trials failed to show that Paxil, when tested against a placebo, or sugar pill, was effective. Neither has been published.
An internal GSK memo shows how the company handled such mixed results. An employee discusses the need "to effectively manage the dissemination of these data in order to minimize any potential negative commercial impact." The document, obtained by the New York attorney general for a lawsuit, also says "it would be commercially unacceptable" for GSK to state that Paxil's effectiveness had not been proved.
But when an FDA reviewer looked at the Paxil trials together, that's exactly what he determined.
It's also the way one of the published study's authors now portrays those results. Despite her previous conclusion, Dr. Karen Wagner of the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston told a group of psychiatrists at a meeting last week that all three Paxil trials proved unsuccessful. Wagner declined to comment after her presentation.
The Paxil pattern held true with other antidepressants that hit the market in the 1990s. Four of the drugs had what researchers considered positive results in treating depression in minors, and the studies were published. There were at least eight unsuccessful trials, and one researcher involved with several said none of those results have been published.
So even though the FDA had not approved use of the antidepressants, other than Prozac, for anyone younger than 18, the literature only gave the impression of growing evidence that the drugs work.
"Perhaps the preponderance of failed trials in depression might have dampened some of the enthusiasm for these drugs, had that information been publicly available, but that is of course speculation," FDA epidemiologist Andrew Mosholder wrote in response to Star-Telegram questions. Mosholder re-viewed many of the drugs, both for effectiveness and safety.
Dr. Graham Emslie, a child psychiatrist at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, took part in several antidepressant studies, including two Paxil trials -- the one deemed a success, and one that wasn't.
It's important to understand, Emslie said, that an unsuccessful trial doesn't necessarily mean a drug doesn't work. Instead, the failure may indicate that the test was poorly designed, so the results may not be scientifically valid.
For example, Emslie believes many of the antidepressant trials failed because they were modeled on adult usage, so dosages were wrong. Emslie and numerous other psychiatrists say the drugs work for their patients.
Still, he said he's uncomfortable with the way some unsuccessful trials in which he participated have not been publicized. Recently, he presented data from one at a conference, and articles on two have been submitted for publication. While he said working with the companies delayed the process, Emslie conceded that he and other researchers often don't push as hard to publish unsuccessful results as they do their successes.
Others are uncomfortable with how companies may limit researchers' access to results -- even when benefiting from their expertise and reputation.
Most major medical centers -- including those in Texas -- demand publishing rights for the data they gather for drug company trials.
But trials usually take place at multiple sites, and officials at one institution cannot typically demand results gathered at others. With only their own information, they usually cannot draw scientifically valid conclusions.
Emslie, who like many top researchers has been a paid consultant and speaker for several drug companies, including GSK, said there's at least one company he likely won't work with again because it refused to share data with him and other researchers.
Schools can also be hamstrung because they sign contracts giving companies a period of exclusive use of the research results. At some Texas medical schools, the delay is as long as two years. That is meant to give the company time to gather and analyze data and coordinate any published articles. But two years is too long, said Korn and others.
Several Texas university officials said they are not aware of many instances when researchers have had problems getting data.
An attorney with the University of Texas System -- which oversees several medical schools -- said that in eight years, she has received only one such complaint.
In that recent case, the UT researcher and counterparts at other participating schools banded together to get data after the company halted a trial, BethLynn Maxwell said.
Although they were initially denied, the company has agreed to cooperate, she said.
Nationally, schools' failure to require full and timely access to data is one of the major holes in the academic oversight system, Korn said.
While, as a practical matter, many schools cannot handle the mountains of data generated in multicenter studies, he said, they should demand the access they need if a study is to be published with their names attached.
"If the company handles the data, what you get is what the company gives you, which may not be a perfectly accurate reflection," Korn said.
Concerns arise
As more studies touted new antidepressants and more kids began taking them, some doctors grew concerned.
The drugs lack some of the debilitating side effects of older antidepressants; that's their primary selling point. But they carry their own potentially serious health risks for some patients, including diabetes and reports of complications associated with withdrawal.
Most troubling to some, there are indications that a small percentage of children were becoming agitated or suicidal.
Mosholder, the FDA researcher, examined all trials of new-generation antidepressants involving children and teens. Although no trial participant committed suicide, Mosholder found that almost 3 percent showed signs of suicidal thoughts or behavior, about twice the percentage of those not taking the drugs.
His findings led the FDA last year to require a prominent "black box" warning on the drugs' packaging, despite some doctors' concerns that the drugs are being unfairly blamed and patients who need them will be scared away.
For the trend to be evident, Mosholder said, it was necessary to look at all the study results combined, including unpublished trials.
To win FDA approval for a new drug, a company has to show that the medication is safe and effective. But companies can set the ground rules for researchers.
Drug companies don't typically design clinical trials to identify uncommon risks, said Dr. Michael Fant of the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, who served on the FDA advisory committee that recommended the warning label. That could have been the case in the antidepressant trials, he said.
"It certainly contributed to some of the limitations in terms of what questions the studies could answer, because the studies are clearly being designed just to achieve a certain standard, and that standard is to get placed on the market," Fant said.
A shortcoming of many company-funded trials is that they pit their medicine against only placebos. Trials pitting the test drug against both a placebo and a competing pill that's known to work would be more telling, Emslie said.
But such studies could show that a competitor's product is superior, he said.
The FDA has raised concerns about how some companies design their trials.
In one study, a company pitted its new heartburn medication against a generic drug. But the new pill was prescribed in a dosage twice as strong as the generic, according to a senior FDA official.
Not surprisingly, the new drug worked better than the older, cheaper one.
Another study the FDA took issue with involved the antidepressant Zoloft.
Wagner, a child-psychiatry expert, was lead author of the study, which supported the use of Zoloft for children with major depression.
The authors reached their conclusion by combining two separate but identically designed studies, neither of which succeeded on its own.
The problem, FDA officials determined, was deciding after the studies began to combine the results. Goals are supposed to be set before the outcome is known.
Pfizer officials declined to comment about the studies. But in written testimony to a congressional committee examining the studies, a company official said the decision to combine data was made before the trials ended and results were known.
Wagner, who also took part in the published Paxil study and who has done consulting work for numerous drug companies, including Pfizer, did not respond to written questions from the Star-Telegram about specific studies.
Critics say that companies have too much power in the process and that their financial ties to some researchers increase their influence. Officials at several universities said that, on the contrary, the independence of their clinicians brings an objective eye to the design and other crucial aspects of company-funded studies.
When companies bypass academic institutions -- which has occurred with increasing frequency in recent years -- there may be far less scrutiny, said Perrie Adams, associate dean for research and a psychiatry professor at UT Southwestern.
Adams said schools have multiple safeguards intended to maintain high standards. Among them are institutional review boards, which must approve all research plans before studies can be done.
Those boards, which may review hundreds of studies a year, are designed primarily to protect the safety of patients in the trials. Part of their role involves examining the study design, Adams said, to weigh potential benefits against any risk.
Question of authorship
In spring 2003, doctors got a special supplement with a medical journal in their mailboxes.
The publication was all about Paxil. Its 15 articles covered topics including the drug's success at treating depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Not one focused exclusively on negative side effects or other shortcomings.
GlaxoSmithKline paid for it through an "unrestricted grant," implying the company didn't control content. And the funding source was explained in multiple disclaimers.
But the bold print went to the authors: respected researchers from some of America's better medical schools.
Supplements like this are an extreme example of the confluence of marketing and academia.
When a drug company is involved in a published study, university researchers are often listed as the primary authors -- the ones most responsible for the content -- with company scientists receiving second billing. But many times the company writes the bulk of an article.
"I think very few people these days who seem to be the authors of trials can in any meaningful way be said to have run the trial," said Dr. David Healy, a psychiatry professor at Cardiff University in Wales and an outspoken critic of drug companies' antidepressant research.
"It used to be, I'd draw up the protocol, get the patients, run the trial. Now, maybe I've been involved in meetings, seen and approved a pharmaceutical-company-written trial," he said. "I won't get to see the raw data at all. But I may be the first author on the paper."
Marketing can shade the content of some articles, critics say, even when the paper appears in a scholarly journal.
The Star-Telegram obtained copies of e-mails that offer a glimpse into how university researchers sometimes negotiate content with drug companies. The names are being withheld to protect the identity of the newspaper's source.
A researcher at a Texas medical school had questions about an article for which the researcher would be listed as lead author. It reported favorable results when testing a bestselling medication for a new use.
The researcher asked whether the weight gained by patients using the drug -- a known risk with such medication -- should be considered significant.
A company official responded, "Obviously, from a marketing perspective, I hope we can avoid making this statement."
Ultimately, the published article terms the weight gain statistically significant.
When the researcher's office asked whether to expound on information about another side effect, a company employee said that was unnecessary.
"We do not want to remove the focus from efficacy in the manuscript," the employee wrote.
Rennie, of the Journal of the American Medical Association, said he doesn't understand why researchers participate in studies where the drug company can heavily influence content.
"It's like saying, 'I totally trust the drug company to be disinterested in how it publishes the results,' " he said. "To which I would say, 'You've got to be joking.' "
How much difference does it make when work is funded by drug companies rather than an independent source?
Dr. John Montgomery, assistant professor of psychiatry at the University of Mississippi Medical Center, and several researchers at UT Southwestern reviewed every article about new-generation antipsychotic drugs up through March 2002. Their conclusion echoes the findings of a growing body of research.
When published studies are sponsored by drug companies, they usually come to the same conclusion: The medicine works.
Montgomery said his study did not find major differences in the quality of the studies, regardless of sponsorship. However, he said there are other ways bias can creep in.
He pointed to one study comparing Risperdal and Zyprexa -- newer antipsychotic drugs. The dosage of Risperdal was so high that it virtually guaranteed significant negative side effects, Montgomery said. The maker of Zyprexa paid for the study.
"That's just one example of how they kind of stack the odds," he said.
Proposals for change
Even most critics agree there's a need for medical schools to work with drug companies. The reality is that only the companies -- which have the most to gain -- are going to put up the millions of dollars necessary.
And medical school researchers -- and their patients -- have much to gain from participating in trials with cutting-edge medications, school officials say.
Academic researchers could benefit from several proposed improvements.
Chief among those is an effort in Congress, supported by many educators, to require all clinical trials to be publicly registered at inception, before results are known. A federal registry exists, but it is far from complete.
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America is creating a voluntary registry where drug companies have agreed to report study findings, regardless of outcome, said Goldhammer, a vice president for the organization. Relatively little has been posted so far, but Goldhammer said companies have until later this year to act.
Some companies are working on their own disclosure programs. GSK is building an Internet database listing results from all clinical trials, even failed ones, on products the company sells, spokesman Rick Koenig said.
But critics say voluntary industry-operated registries won't work.
Wagner said through a spokeswoman at UT Medical Branch at Galveston that she supports creating a national registry, as well as other safeguards "that will make the research process more transparent and safer without compromising the ability of scientists to do the work that leads to advances in health care."
Korn said his association and others plan to work on a set of principles and guidelines that universities should follow when conducting industry-sponsored research. He said it's up to the schools to become more demanding, such as insisting on timelier access to all the data. But he knows that will be a tough sell to drug companies.
"The companies will tell you they paid for the study and they own all the data and they can do what they want with it," Korn said.
Some industry critics say the system's flaws are too fundamental to be easily repaired.
There was once a clearer separation between industry researchers and their university counterparts, said Vera Hassner Sharav, who heads the drug industry watchdog group Alliance for Human Research Protection. The industry looked to university researchers as a "credibility bridge" to bring validity to studies, she said.
"But it turns out they're really partners," she said. "Once you have a scientist and the institution in partnership with industry, you've broken the fire wall that existed."
IN THE KNOW
Industry research funding
Texas academic medical centers received the following in research grants from pharmaceutical and biotech companies between 2001 and 2003:
· University of Texas $107.8 million M.D. Anderson Cancer Center · University of Texas $27.8 million Health Science Center at San Antonio · University of Texas $27.4 million Health Science Center at Houston · University of Texas $22 million Medical Branch at Galveston · University of Texas $16.5 million Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas · Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center $8.1 million · University of Texas Health Center at Tyler $3.2 million · University of North Texas Health Science Center $2.2 million · Texas A&M University System Health Science Center $1.1 million TOTAL $216.1 million
· The total represents about 8 percent of all research dollars reported. The bulk of research funding comes from the federal government.
· An additional $34 million in donations was reported by five schools, with UT Southwestern accounting for $21 million of that.
· Some schools did not report a full three years' worth of data, and in some cases fiscal years are represented instead of calendar years. The figures reflect grant money awarded, not necessarily the amount spent.
SOURCES: The institutions, Star-Telegram analysis Mark Horvit, (817) 390-7087 mhorvit@star-telegram.com
Herman Rubin - 18 Jan 2005 20:37 GMT >"Academic experts have stood by while companies kept unsuccessful >results from the public. "Money," {Drummond} Rennie said. "Money for >yourself, money for your unit, money for all the people you employ on >other research, money for travel. Money is a very, very powerful >influence here." THIS should be made a major felony. I have consistently maintained that a manufacturer needs to give ALL the information about the product, including the adverse information, and this should protect from liability.
BTW, while this cannot be done, negative studies should be published. The use of meta-analysis when this is not done is invalid, and this is heavily done. A fair number of current medical advice is based upon this misuse of statistics.
 Signature This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University. Herman Rubin, Department of Statistics, Purdue University hrubin@stat.purdue.edu Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558
Zee - 19 Jan 2005 00:33 GMT > >"Academic experts have stood by while companies kept unsuccessful > >results from the public. "Money," {Drummond} Rennie said. "Money for [quoted text clipped - 18 lines] > Herman Rubin, Department of Statistics, Purdue University > hrubin@stat.purdue.edu Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558 Hired Education A hidden culprit in the drug scandals: the increasingly corporatized university.
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId46
By Jennifer Washburn Issue Date: 02.04.05
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M. Michael Wolfe, a gastroenterologist at Boston University, admits he was duped by the Pharmacia Corporation, the manufacturer of the blockbuster arthritis drug Celebrex. (In 2003, the company was purchased by Pzer.) In the summer of 2000, The Journal of the American Medical Association asked Wolfe to write a review of a study showing that Celebrex was associated with lower rates of stomach and intestinal ulcers and other complications than two older arthritis medications, diclofenac and ibuprofen. Wolfe found the study, tracking 8,000 patients over a six-month period, persuasive, and penned a favorable review, which helped to drive up Celebrex sales.
But early the next year, while serving on the Food and Drug Administrations (FDA) arthritis advisory committee, Wolfe had occasion to review the same drug trial again, and was abbergasted by what he saw. Pharmacias study had run for one year, not six months, as the company had originally led both Wolfe and the Journal to believe. When the complete data was considered, most of Celebrexs advantages disappeared because the ulcer complications that occurred during the second half of the study were disproportionately found in patients taking Celebrex.
I am furious, Wolfe told The Washington Post in 2001. I looked like a fool. But ... all I had available to me was the data presented in the article. Remarkably, none of the Journal studys 16 authors, including eight university professors, had spoken out publicly about this egregious suppression of negative data. All the authors were either employees of Pharmacia or paid consultants of the company.
Celebrex, an anti-inammatory drug similar to Vioxx, is once again in the news due to concerns that it may be associated with the same cardiovascular risks that caused Vioxx to get yanked from the market. In recent months, weve heard a great deal about conicts of interest at both the FDA, the agency that approves drugs for public safety, and the National Institutes of Health, where publicly funded scientists moonlight as consultants for the very companies that manufactured the drugs they are testing. Still largely ignored, however, is the role played by the once-autonomous ivory tower and the university scientists who, either knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate the pharmaceutical industrys manipulation of drug testing by lending it an aura of objectivity.
Today, market forces are dictating what is happening in the world of higher education as never before, causing universities to look and behave more and more like business enterprises. Instead of honoring their traditional commitment to teaching, disinterested research, and the broad dissemination of knowledge, universities are aggressively striving to become research arms of private industry. Faced with declining government funding, they are avidly seeking to enhance their role as engines of economic growth, promising state legislators and governors that they will help drive regional economic development by pumping out commercially valuable inventions.
This radical redenition of the universitys mission can be traced back to the economic stagnation of the 1970s. Propelled by heightened competition from Germany and Japan, Congress passed landmark legislation in 1980 that allowed universities to automatically retain the rights to intellectual property stemming from taxpayer-nanced research. The intent of the legislation, popularly known as the Bayh-Dole Act (its sponsors were Senators Birch Bayh and Bob Dole), was to stimulate innovation and speed the transfer of federally nanced research to industry. What it accomplished in the process was the introduction of a dangerous new prot motive into the heart of the university.
As a result, schools now routinely operate expensive patenting and licensing operations to market their facultys inventions, extracting royalty income and other fees in return. They invest their endowment money in risky startup rms founded by their professors. They run their own industrial parks and venture capital funds. They publish newsletters encouraging faculty members to commercialize new research by launching independent, faculty-owned companies. Star professors consult for, or hold equity in, the same rms that manufacture the drugs they are studying, while also often accepting generous fees to join corporate advisory boards and speakers bureaus. Sometimes these professors even hold the patent to the drug or device being tested. In a study of 800 scientic papers published in leading journals of medicine and molecular biology, Sheldon Krimsky, a professor of public policy at Tufts University, found that slightly more than a third of the lead authors based at research institutions in Massachusetts had a signicant nancial interest in their own reports. So pervasive are such ties that journal editors now frequently complain that they can no longer nd academic experts who do not have a nancial interest in a drug or therapy the journal would like to review.
Research suggests that publicly funded science, most of it performed at universities, was a critical contributor to the discovery of nearly all of the 25 most important breakthrough drugs introduced between 1970 and 1995. If university scientists lose their independence, who will perform this pathbreaking research and objectively evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs already on the market? Conicts of interest are more than an academic concern. When it comes to health policy, they pose a serious threat to public health.
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With the possible exception of business schools, the nations medical schools have been more inltrated by industry than any other sector of the university. Pharmaceutical companies sponsor daily lunches for medical students at which they market their latest drugs; they ply professors with fancy dinners, gifts, luxurious trips, and free prescriptions designed to inuence medical decisions and prescribing habits. The drug industry also spends millions of dollars nancing clinical drug research at the academy, but increasingly this money comes with many more strings attached. After conducting a thorough review of the medical literature for The New England Journal of Medicine in 2000, Thomas Bodenheimer, an internist at the University of California, San Francisco, concluded that academic investigators were rapidly ceding to industry control over nearly every stage of the clinical research process.
In the past, for example, it was common for university scientists to initiate the research protocol. Now, studies are frequently conceived and designed in the companys own pharmacological and marketing departments, thus removing this formative stage of the research from academic hands almost entirely. The company then shops the study around to various academic institutions (and a growing number of competing for-prot subcontractors that run clinical trials) in search of investigators to conduct the research. As university medical schools have grown more dependent on industry grants to sustain their operations, their professors have become increasingly willing to accept an industry-initiated protocol without modication, even though the study may be largely designed to secure a companys market position. Should a professor reject the study or insist on changes, another university scientist will very likely be more solicitous.
Industry also encourages the use of ghostwriters on scientic papers. This means an article or review bylined by a prominent academic might in fact have been written by a medical-communications company working for the drugmaker, with the author paid an honorarium to attach his or her name to it. When Wyeth-Ayerst sought to boost market demand for Redux, one part of the once highly popular fen-phen diet-drug combination, the company hired a company called Excerpta Medica to help draft the manuscripts and pay doctors to review and sign the articles. One of the many doctors who signed Excerptas papers was Richard Atkinson, a renowned obesity expert at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Atkinson denied having any knowledge of Excerptas connection to Wyeth, but as an independent academic, he nonetheless agreed to lend his name to a company he apparently knew little about. (Excerpta maintains that all its authors were told of the companys association with the manufacturer.) In a deposition on January 15, 1999, Wyeth-Ayerst executive Jo Alene Dolan admitted that her company had written the article for Atkinson, stressing that all drug companies ghostwrite articles. Shortly before the article could be published, Redux was pulled from the market because of its association with serious heart and lung problems.
Scientists who perform industry-sponsored research are also asked routinely to sign legal contracts requiring them to keep both the methods and the results of their work secret for a period of time. Research conducted by David Blumenthal and Eric Campbell, health-policy researchers at Harvard University, suggests that data withholding and publication delays have become far more common over the last 25 years, particularly in molecular biology, medicine, and other life-science disciplines, where commercial relationships have grown dramatically in recent years. In a survey of 2,167 life-science faculty, Blumenthal found that nearly one in ve of them had delayed publication for more than six months to protect proprietary information.
Industry also manipulates academic research by suppressing negative studies altogether. Recently, it came to light that a whole class of popular antidepressants -- including such heavily prescribed drugs as Paxil, Zoloft, and Prozac -- are largely ineffectual in treating childhood depression and actually increase the risk of suicide. One of the main reasons this information was not available to doctors and the broader public, it turns out, is that the academic investigators who led these studies either allowed industry to bury their research or were complicit in downplaying negative ndings in their own published papers. How prevalent is such corporate meddling? The question has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, but what research does exist is not encouraging. One survey of major university-industry research centers in the eld of engineering, for example, found that 35 percent would allow corporate sponsors to delete information from papers prior to publication.
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But all the blame for the eroding objectivity of university researchers does not rest with industry. Universities themselves are complicit: They are so nancially invested in their professors research through patents, equity, and other nancial holdings that their disinterested pursuit of knowledge has been gravely compromised. For instance, when the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis longtime director, Professor John D. Graham, was nominated by President George W. Bush to become the governments regulatory czar at the Ofce of Information and Regulatory Affairs (part of the Ofce of Management and Budget), it helped to expose just how extensive Harvards nancial conicts really were. Congressional hearings revealed that Grahams center solicited tobacco money and worked with the tobacco industry to disparage the risks of secondhand smoke. (Harvey Fineberg, a dean at the Harvard School of Public Health, demanded that one check from Philip Morris be returned. In response, Graham wrote to the company asking if it might send the $25,000 back to the Harvard center via the Philip Morris subsidiary Kraft Foods instead.) Grahams center also argued that cell-phone use by drivers should not be restricted, even though its own research, which was funded by AT&T Wireless Communications, showed that such use could lead to a thousand additional highway deaths a year. As a member of the Environmental Protection Agencys scientic advisory board subcommittee on dioxin, a known human carcinogen, Graham argued that reducing dioxin levels might do more harm than good. His Harvard center, meanwhile, was heavily funded by dioxin producers.
Worse yet, the universities loyalties are now so conicted that schools are increasingly willing to cave in to narrow commercial demands rather than defend their own professors academic freedom or the public interest. When researchers at the University of Utah discovered an important human gene responsible for hereditary breast cancer, for example, they didnt make it freely available to other scientists, even though we -- the U.S. taxpayers -- paid $4.6 million to nance the research. The university raced to patent it, then granted the monopoly rights to Myriad Genetics Inc., a startup company founded by a University of Utah professor, which proceeded to hoard the gene and prevent other academic scientists from using it.
Professors, too, are increasingly driven by the bottom line. More and more, they not only accept industry grants to support their research but also hold stock in or have other nancial ties to the companies funding them. Many experts fear this skewing of professors research toward short-term commercial goals will impede long-term scientic and technological innovation. Financial entanglements between researchers and corporations have grown so common that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has investigated numerous academic researchers suspected of engaging in insider trading. In a case led in Pennsylvania, the SEC charged Dale J. Lange, a Columbia University neurologist, with pocketing $26,000 in prots after Lange bought stock in a company that was about to release promising new ndings concerning a drug to treat Lou Gehrigs disease. Lange had good reason to expect the stock to soar because he had conducted the condential clinical trials himself. In 2000, an investigation by USA Today found that more than half the experts hired to advise the U.S. government on the safety and effectiveness of drugs -- a large number of whom are academics -- now have nancial links to companies that will be affected by their conclusions.
When Wyeth-Ayerst was trying to get its diet drug, Redux, approved for sale in the United States, for example, it faced a serious hurdle: Patients in Europe who had taken a drug virtually identical to Redux had an increased chance of getting a rare, life-threatening lung ailment known as pulmonary hypertension. To combat this negative health prole, the company packed an FDA hearing room with a whos who list of the nations top academic obesity experts, all of whom were also paid consultants to Wyeth-Ayerst or other companies involved in the sale of Redux. In addition, the company recruited expert opinion leaders, such as George Blackburn, a renowned obesity expert at Harvard, to testify before the Medical Society of Massachusetts for approval of the drug. Blackburn and other academic luminaries further participated in the companys Visiting Important Professors Program and were paid thousands of dollars in honoraria to y to fancy resorts and promote Redux at medical conferences. Not surprisingly, the drug handily won market approval, and prescriptions in the United States began to soar.
Soon, however, evidence of the drugs association with lung damage surfaced once again, and the company turned to leading university scientists to do damage control. In the summer of 1996, an internal company memo revealed that the company was planning to spend $5.8 million to pay for more university-based studies, noting that that money was needed to establish and maintain relationships with opinion leaders at the local and national level to communicate to their colleagues the benets of Redux and to encourage its use. Among the many doctors willing to heed the companys call was Atkinson, the obesity expert at the University of Wisconsin, whose name appeared on a company-authored article. Let me congratulate you and your writer, wrote Atkinson in a thank-you letter to the ghostwriting rm that was one of numerous company documents that became public during subsequent legal proceedings. Perhaps I can get you to write all my papers for me!
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So how does this growing web of academic-industry ties affect research outcomes? A vast body of work suggests that industry-funded research is far from impartial. In 1996, Stanford researcher Mildred Cho co-authored a study in the Annals of Internal Medicine that found that 98 percent of papers based on industry-sponsored research reected favorably on the drugs being examined, compared with 79 percent of papers based on research not funded by industry. An analysis published in The Journal of the American Medical Association in 1999 found that studies of cancer drugs funded by the pharmaceutical industry were nearly eight times less likely to reach unfavorable conclusions than similar studies funded by nonprot organizations. More recently, a systematic review of 1,140 clinical trial studies, published by researchers at Yale in 2003, concluded that, from cancer to arthritis to cholesterol, the evidence is overwhelming that when research is industry-sponsored, it is signicantly more likely to reach conclusions that [are] favorable to the sponsor than nonindustry-funded research.
In the area of health and drug research, of course, the results of such manipulation can be deadly. Running down the list of drugs recently pulled from the market or subject to increased health warnings -- Rezulin, the diabetes drug; Redux (or fen-phen), the diet drug; Retin-A, the anti-wrinkle cream; Neurontin, the epilepsy drug; Paxil, Zoloft, and the many other antidepressants now deemed ineffective for children -- one nds that a remarkable number of prominent university professors with close nancial ties to the manufacturers played a central role in lobbying for these drugs to be approved, recommending them to other doctors, and, in many cases, urging that they remain on the market long after the problems or lack of effectiveness became known. Not infrequently, the university scientists who shill for the drug companies most aggressively are also the biggest-name professors in their elds.
Universities have gone out of their way to assure the public that their clinical trials meet the highest standards of scientic excellence and academic rigor. But over the last 20 years, public dismay over the growing nancial entanglements in clinical research has prompted the federal government to impose tougher conict-of-interest regulations, only to encounter erce university opposition. In 1995, the federal government nally succeeded in pushing through rules that would apply to all academic researchers funded by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) or the National Science Foundation (NSF). But the rules, which remain in place today, were not tough enough to be effective. Although they mandate that serious conicts of interest must be managed and/or eliminated, they leave the determination of what action is to be taken, if any, entirely up to the university. The policy also doesnt provide any guidance on which conicts warrant serious attention, nor does it impose any prohibitions, such as banning nancial conicts outright in the area of human-subject research. Signicantly, the policy also says nothing about institutional conicts of interest.
The result, not surprisingly, is that university conict-of-interest rules vary widely. One comprehensive 2000 survey of the written policies at 100 academic institutions found that only 55 percent of schools required disclosure of conicts of interest from all faculty, and only 19 percent specied any limits on researchers nancial ties to corporate sponsors. Worse yet, under this fragmented system, there is enormous pressure on universities to keep their policies lax. Schools with tighter restrictions run the risk of losing talented faculty to competing schools with more permissive policies, where the nancial rewards and commercial prospects are likely to be greater.
Another conspicuous problem with the HHS/NSF policy is that it does not require universities to make any of the information they compile on faculty nancial conicts available to the public. Many academic journals do require their authors to disclose corporate nancial ties. But in practice, reporting is astonishingly poor. In a 2001 study, Tufts Krimsky found that a mere 0.5 percent of the 61,134 papers appearing in 181 peer-reviewed journals contained statements about the authors nancial ties. More recent studies have found similarly low levels of reporting.
In some respects, the whole debate reects how far the academic world remains from dealing seriously with the issue; disclosure of potential conicts of interest is, after all, a far cry from eliminating them outright, as many professions not only recommend but also require. In the legal profession, for example, attorneys are prohibited from taking on cases in which they have a nancial interest or other explicit conicts that might be seen to compromise their professional integrity. The same is true of judges. But when it comes to academia, neither the medical community nor the government (whether through Congress or the regulatory agencies) has taken up the task, instead proceeding under the assumption that universities can be trusted to manage these commercial interactions themselves. Its a nice idea. But are academic institutions really capable of performing this function? There is good reason to be skeptical: Far from being independent watchdogs capable of dispassionate inquiry, universities are increasingly joined at the hip to the very market forces the public has entrusted them to check, creating problems that extend far beyond the research lab.
Adapted from the book University, Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education, by Jennifer Washburn. Copyright 2005.
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