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Medical Forum / Diseases and Disorders / AIDS / October 2005

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Building an orphanage in Kenya...Ken-Ya Help?

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drumma777 - 12 Oct 2005 16:34 GMT
Harvest Fellowship church in Stevens, PA is trying to make a difference
in the lives of a small group of orphans in Kenya.  They purchased
around six acres of land and started the building progress of the
orphanage.  The land is in a town called Ngoliba about 90 miles NE of
Nairobi.  They are still in need of funds to complete the building
which is expected to be done by spring 2006. About $80,000 is needed
yet and every little bit helps.  Also, much prayer is needed that God
would send the funds to finish this important project.  The churches
website is http://www.harvestpa.com and you can visit it if you would
like to know more about the project and contact the church.  There are
pictures from the recent work group that was over to help start the
building and a newspaper article about the trip from a local paper.
The other thing that's really nice is that you can actually make a
secure, tax deductible donation right online with a credit card.  It's
done through PayPal and you don't even need a PayPal account.  You'll
be e-mailed a receipt for your donation which is tax deductible.  I
also know that 100% of the money will be used toward the completion of
the orphanage.  Keep checking the church website for information on
sponsoring a child who you will be able to interact with through the
churches website (view/send photos & messages).  

God Bless!
Polly Prissypants - 12 Oct 2005 20:51 GMT
drumma777 wrote..., On 10/12/2005 08:34:
> Harvest Fellowship church in Stevens, PA is trying to make a difference
> in the lives of a small group of orphans in Kenya.  They purchased
[quoted text clipped - 18 lines]
>
> God Bless!

I can help.  I am an official in the Kenyan Ministry of Public Works
and a construction project was recently completed that cost less than
was budgeted for it, so as a result there is a sum of forty-five million
dollars ($45,000,000 US) left in the account.  Under Kenyan law the
money cannot be returned to the treasury, and strict financial
regulations prohibit government officials like myself from using it for
any purpose other than what it was originally budgeted for.  So I require
your assistance in this matter, if you provide me with your full contact
information along with the name and address of your bank and your account
number, I can transfer it to your account and allow you to keep 15% of
it ($6,750,000 US) as a commission.

Yours ever so sincerely,

Bwamaba Mfubi
bmfubi@hotmail.com
Death - 13 Oct 2005 02:07 GMT
"Polly Prissypants" <polly@prissy.pants.net> wrote in message

>  So I require your assistance in this matter, if you provide me with your full contact
> information along with the name and address of your bank and your account
> number, ...

LOL.
Alex - 13 Oct 2005 06:05 GMT
You want to help people in Kenya?

Help them get land reform through their parliament.

The biggest reason for poverty (and the directly linked
bad health and death from preventable diseases) in Kenya,
is that farming people do not have access to land or own
their own land. After that comes access to mechanical equipment.

Alex

> Harvest Fellowship church in Stevens, PA is trying to make a difference
> in the lives of a small group of orphans in Kenya.  They purchased
[quoted text clipped - 18 lines]
>
> God Bless!
Death - 13 Oct 2005 16:37 GMT
"Alex" <avdeelen.REMOFETHIS1@wanadoo.nl> wrote in message

> You want to help people in Kenya?

no

> is that farming people do not have
(A.) >access to land or
(B.)>own their own land.

Huh ?
Alex - 16 Oct 2005 04:56 GMT
> "Alex" <avdeelen.REMOFETHIS1@wanadoo.nl> wrote in message
>
> > You want to help people in Kenya?
>
> no

Really? How is that?

Alex
Wellington Bear - 16 Oct 2005 09:23 GMT
Alex wrote..., On 10/15/2005 20:56:

>>"Alex" <avdeelen.REMOFETHIS1@wanadoo.nl> wrote in message
>>
[quoted text clipped - 3 lines]
>
> Really? How is that?

Well, we've probably sent Kenya several billion dollars in aid already,
almost all of which is sitting is some Swiss bank account.  Giving
them more money or stuff isn't going to help them, only joining the 21st
century will help them.

And to be fair, Kenya is one of the more stable countries in Africa, not
experiencing a coup every few weeks.  I believe they made a decision to
preserve the wild habitat so as to attract rich Western tourists who
want to see lions and giraffes - someone suggested "land reform" which
would likely see that habitat sold to Western commercial farming
companies at best, and Wal-Mart at worst.
Alex - 16 Oct 2005 13:24 GMT
> Alex wrote..., On 10/15/2005 20:56:
> >
[quoted text clipped - 7 lines]
>
> Well, we've probably sent Kenya several billion dollars in aid already,

You didn't.

In fact, it is South Africa that has sent YOU tens of billions of
dollars in gold and diamonds.
It is Nigeria that has sent YOU tens of billions of dollars in oil.

Alex
GMCarter - 16 Oct 2005 14:39 GMT
snip
>You didn't.
>
>In fact, it is South Africa that has sent YOU tens of billions of
>dollars in gold and diamonds.
>It is Nigeria that has sent YOU tens of billions of dollars in oil.

Here's where I agree with you, Alex. And the dead cold lies of the
Bush adminstration continue apace, along with the rape and economic
genocide of Africa.

        George M. Carter

**
Feature
The Lost Children of AIDS
By Helen Epstein

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18399

In January 2003, President George W. Bush asked Congress for $15
billion to fund international AIDS programs in developing countries
under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR. One
tenth of the money was to be spent on children whose parents were
victims of AIDS. Most of this money would go to Africa, home to some
12 million such children who for nearly two decades had been all but
forgotten by their own governments, as well as by foreign donors such
as the US.

The new money is part of a welcome trend. Rich governments and private
donors now spend some $6 billion a year on international AIDS
programs, twenty times more than they did a decade ago. Funding is
also increasing for programs to help what are known in aid circles as
"orphans and vulnerable children," or OVCs. These are children who
lack parental care because their parents have died of AIDS or are too
sick to look after them. The OVCs category also includes the
relatively small number of such children who are HIV-positive
themselves.[1] Roughly $600 million will be spent on aid programs for
OVCs in 2005, and this is predicted to triple by 2007.

While this is good news in many respects, it may also be cause for
concern. As foreign aid budgets rise, they tend to become more
political and sometimes less effective. I worked in Uganda during the
early 1990s when the country's HIV infection rate was at its peak,
with some two million people infected. In response, foreign donors
were pouring money into the country, but it wasn't always clear
whether it was going to the right places. European and American
consultants came and went from the airport and their brand-new sport
utility vehicles churned up the narrow lanes of slums and villages
across the country. They hired servants and guards and drivers and
translators and set up offices in newly renovated buildings in
Kampala's genteel suburbs. Ugandans tended to greet them with outward
courtesy and inward skepticism. In private discussions they wondered
why the aid workers were spending so much money on offices and
vehicles and staff residences that were palatial by local standards,
when so many Ugandans were sick and poor and hungry.

The Ugandans were right to wonder. At least 60 percent of US foreign
aid funding never leaves the US, but is instead spent on office
overhead, travel, procurement of American-made cars, computers, and
other equipment, as well as salary and benefit packages so generous
that just one of them would be enough to feed, clothe, and educate
hundreds of African children for years.[2] Some of the money that
arrives in Africa is well spent, but much of it is wasted on
ill-conceived projects designed by foreign technocrats with little
sense of African realities. In the high-stakes scramble for funding,
the best projects—those that truly meet the needs of local people so
that they can eventually support themselves—are often overlooked.
People used to joke that there were two kinds of AIDS in Uganda: "slim
AIDS" and "fat AIDS." Those with "slim AIDS" grow thinner and thinner
and thinner until they finally disappear. "Fat AIDS" afflicts
development agency bureaucrats, foreign consultants, and medical
experts who attend lavish conferences and workshops in exotic places,
earn large salaries, and get fatter and fatter.

In June 2005, I accompanied Jonathan Cohen of Human Rights Watch on a
mission to South Africa to report on discrimination against AIDS
orphans in the education system. Among the many organizations we
visited were two programs funded by President Bush's PEPFAR that made
me wonder whether history might be repeating itself. Between them,
these programs had received roughly $10 million from the US government
to help AIDS orphans but, like some of the programs I had seen in
Uganda, very little of it seemed to be reaching the people who need it
most.[3]

It is far too early to pass judgment on the entire five-year PEPFAR
program, slated to run until at least 2008. Most PEPFAR funding is
being used to support medical treatment for AIDS patients and HIV
prevention programs. Early assessments have been mixed. PEPFAR is
supporting some exemplary AIDS treatment programs such as the AIDS
Support Organization (TASO) in Uganda and the South African Catholic
Bishops Conference, but much of the money for HIV prevention is going
to evangelical Christian groups that disparage condoms.[4] In
addition, treatment programs are reaching fewer people than was
originally hoped. The dire state of African clinics and hospitals is
part of the problem, but the greed of US-based contractors is also a
factor.

For example, the Maryland-based Institute of Human Virology proposed
to spend $600,000 to hire three consultants to "mentor" South African
health workers—an amount that could have been spent on antiretroviral
drug treatment for some five hundred poor South Africans. In another
example, the North Carolina–based Family Health International proposed
to hand over $1 million of a $3 million PEPFAR grant to Northrop
Grumman, a military contractor, which would conduct "monitoring and
evaluation" of Family Health's orphan programs. Under the terms of the
original contract, which was fortunately changed, Family Health
International and Northrop Grumman would each receive more than twice
as much money as all the orphans combined.

The US government makes it nearly impossible to obtain detailed
financial information about its foreign aid programs, and federal
agencies have thus far failed to give me information about the
programs described here; a Freedom of Information Act request has been
pending for two months. USAID officials need to tell us more about
where taxpayers' dollars go after they leave their offices, if sending
money to Africa is to do more than merely make Americans feel good
about themselves.
1.

In December 2002, the American talk-show host Oprah Winfrey rented a
sports complex near Soweto, the vast black township on the outskirts
of Johannesburg, South Africa, and gave a party for 124 AIDS orphans.
There are around one million such children in South Africa. Most live
in extreme poverty and many suffer from abuse, discrimination, and
neglect. At the party there was food, dancing and singing, and a gift
for each child—for some, it was the first they had ever received. "One
little girl was so excited that she could not open her present, and
instead was kissing the plastic," Oprah told South Africa's Star
newspaper after the party.

When we were in South Africa, Jonathan and I met some of the orphans
who had attended Oprah's Christmas party. We were introduced to them
by Elizabeth Rapuleng, a stout, elderly African woman who lives in
Meadowlands, a bleak neighborhood of tiny concrete houses on a flat
dusty plain on the edge of Soweto. At the time of Oprah's party,
Elizabeth was working for Hope Worldwide, a US-based Christian charity
that runs medical relief programs in seventy-five countries. Hope is
linked to the International Church of Christ, a fundamentalist
evangelical Christian group, and receives funding from the church
itself, the US government, and various private donors.

In 2002, Hope was one of the largest US nongovernmental organizations
working on AIDS in South Africa, and had been providing counseling,
medical care, and HIV prevention advice to patients for some ten
years. So when Oprah wanted to give a party for orphans in Soweto, she
naturally contacted Mark Ottenweller, the director of Hope's South
African office. At the time, Hope had just begun to work with orphans,
but Ottenweller knew that his colleague Elizabeth ran an organization
in Meadowlands called Sizanani Home Based Caregivers that provided
food, counseling, and other services to many such children, and he
asked Elizabeth to invite them to the party.

As publicity for Hope, Oprah's party was a great success. Oprah's
Angel Network charity produced a film in which Ottenweller introduces
Oprah to some of the orphans. Hope's press release about the party is
still on its Web site three years later. Around the time of the party,
Hope began negotiations with PEPFAR officials and in 2004 it received
an $8 million US government contract to provide services to 165,000
AIDS-affected children in South Africa and five other African
countries. We can imagine that its chances were not hurt by the
publicity from the party and the link with Oprah.

Meanwhile Sizanani—Elizabeth's organization—was struggling for funds.
In 2001, Elizabeth, along with her two grown daughters, Florence and
Dorothy, had established Sizanani with a small grant from the South
African government's Department of Social Development. The
administration of President Thabo Mbeki has been rightly criticized
for downplaying the impact of AIDS in South Africa. However, for the
past four years it has been funding a small number of "Drop-In
Centres" like Sizanani that provide services to OVC children. Africa
has few formal orphanages. It is the policy of African governments and
international agencies to keep as many children as possible out of
institutions, and to encourage extended families to take in orphans.
However, as Jonathan and I found, and as other studies have shown,
many families are too poor to care for extra children and even in
relatively well-to-do families, AIDS orphans are sometimes abused and
neglected. They are less likely to attend school than the biological
children of their guardians, they are more likely to be forced to
perform arduous labor, and they are more likely to be physically
abused and raped by guardians and others.[5]

In the late 1990s, the South African government began to recognize
that its own child welfare officers and social workers—of which there
are now only three for all of Soweto, with a population of well over a
million— could not meet the needs of the nation's rapidly growing
orphan population. Experience from other African countries has shown
that small, locally run and managed organizations can provide a
crucial safety net for OVCs.[6] So the Department of Social
Development began funding a small number of organizations throughout
the country —Sizanani among them—to provide AIDS-affected children
with food and clothing and other basic needs and to identify cases of
abuse or neglect.

Elizabeth had been born and raised in Meadowlands and during the
preceding decade she had seen how the AIDS epidemic was wrecking her
community. The willingness of African families to take in so many
orphans has been seen as an expression of the spirit of "Ubuntu"—the
ancient African concept of shared humanity captured in the traditional
Zulu saying "A person is a person through other people." However,
Elizabeth knew that Ubuntu had its limits. As she witnessed the
unfolding horror of the AIDS crisis, she wanted to create a
community-based center that would be open all the time where orphans
and children with sick parents could receive free food and other
necessities, and where they could play safely and find adults who
could help them if they were in distress. She wanted, as far as
possible, to give these children the care they lacked. When she heard
about the new government funding, she jumped at the chance.

Today Sizanani has headquarters in a shipping container behind a
church in Meadowlands. It employs twenty-eight staff who work as
counselors, cooks, drivers, and drama and sports coaches. After school
hours and on weekends, the yard outside the shipping container is
alive with children's shouts and games until the church gates close at
dusk. The children receive three meals a day and snacks, as well as
clothes, toothpaste, and other necessities. When the principal of a
local state-run school tried to expel some Sizanani children because
they could not afford tuition, Elizabeth badgered him into letting
them attend for free. In South Africa, even state-run schools charge
fees, but by law, principals must admit all children, even if they are
too poor to pay. In practice, many schools refuse to waive the fees
and many poor children—especially orphans— drop out, unless an adult
is willing to advocate for their rights. When Elizabeth finds a child
being beaten or otherwise abused, she calls the police. When the abuse
doesn't stop, she moves the children into her own tiny house.

So far she has rescued seven children from particularly abusive homes,
including a teenage girl whose uncle used to drag her from her bed
night after night and send her out in the dark to buy beer for him at
a local pub. Even now, the uncle sometimes comes around to Elizabeth's
place and calls for his niece in a drunken rage. Another
fifteen-year-old orphan decided she could stand her aunt's beatings no
longer, and fled to Johannesburg where, she said later, she planned to
kill herself. Elizabeth frantically looked for her everywhere. The
aunt seemed unconcerned. Elizabeth contacted local government social
workers, who got in touch with their colleagues in Johannesburg. They
discovered the girl three days later wandering the streets of the
city, and brought her back to Meadowlands. She now lives with
Elizabeth too.

Elizabeth pays for the care of all these children out of her own
Sizanani salary of $400 per month. The government offers a foster-care
grant to guardians like her, but the application process is so
bureaucratic and laborious that only some 2 percent of eligible
children benefit from it.[7]

In her small office inside the shipping container, Elizabeth spends
most of her time writing letters and making phone calls, trying to
raise money. She worries about whether there will be enough food for
the children, whether they all have toothpaste and shoes, and whether
they are all going to school. The South African government provides
Sizanani $60,000 a year, an amount that Elizabeth reckons permits the
group to help about half the orphans in Meadowlands who need it.
Moreover, the payments from the government sometimes arrive months
late. She receives occasional donations of food and clothing, but it
is never enough. So, shortly after Oprah's party, Elizabeth asked
Hope's directors whether they would be willing to help support
Sizanani.

Elizabeth reasoned that Hope's existing programs, though valuable,
could not reach most of the children who needed help. Hope runs group
counseling services in health clinics for AIDS patients and their
children, but the counseling sessions take place only once a week, and
are not open to children whose parents have already died of AIDS or
are in a state of denial and refuse to be tested for HIV or to enroll
in antiretroviral drug programs. Hope also places social workers in a
small number of schools around the country who train teachers to run
group therapy sessions for troubled children and to conduct a
fifteen-step "bereavement curriculum." But Elizabeth knew that
traumatized children need more than occasional support groups and
short-term counseling services; they need stable, daily human
contact—a group of people to rely on and trust, to make them feel less
abandoned—something a weekly support group can't provide.

Hope officials in South Africa declined to support Sizanani, saying
that Hope did not support "feeding programs"—an odd claim in view of
all the help Sizanani gives aside from meals.[8] Eventually, Elizabeth
quit her job at Hope to run Sizanani full time. She received
occasional donations of food or other items from Hope, but otherwise
did not hear from them. Then in 2004 officials from Hope contacted her
again. They wished to offer Sizanani a "Memorandum of Understanding,"
or MOU. According to this document, Hope would promise to help
Sizanani by "reviewing its current HIV/AIDS-related needs and
responses"; by "developing/strengthening a local working group on HIV/
AIDS"; by "developing HIV/OVC strategies"; by "developing community
competency"; and by performing other, similarly vague activities.
Meanwhile, Sizanani would continue to pay its own staff, purchase all
supplies of food and other commodities for the children, and provide
"space and resources" for its own programs. In addition, Sizanani
would be required to fill out three sets of forms each month listing
the number of children helped, the "kids clubs" set up, and other
data, and send these forms to Hope. Hope would provide no money.

Elizabeth declined the offer. "I'd been running this program for three
years," she said. "Why do I need advice from them?" The offer did seem
odd. Hope's South African budget is several million dollars a year;
Sizanani's is $60,000. Sizanani has offices in a shipping container;
Hope has offices in one of the most exclusive neighborhoods in South
Africa.

What was Hope up to? Hope officials did not return my phone calls, but
it is possible to imagine their concerns. In 2004, Hope Worldwide
received an $8 million grant from PEPFAR to "support the care" of
165,000 orphans. Hope officials probably knew this was an overly
ambitious target. However, like other organizations that receive
PEPFAR funding, Hope is now under enormous pressure to produce
statistics on the numbers of children it has helped in some way. This
may explain the mysterious Memorandum of Understanding, which was
presented to Sizanani in late 2004, around the time Hope received its
PEPFAR grant. Had Sizanani signed the MOU, Hope would have been able
to claim right away that it was "supporting care" for all three
hundred of the children registered with the organization, even though
it was doing virtually nothing for them.

Every month, PEPFAR officials report to Congress how many people have
been helped by its programs overseas. This is important to the Bush
administration because PEPFAR has political as well as humanitarian
goals. President Bush announced the $15 billion PEPFAR program on
national television one week before the declaration of war against
Iraq, and it was meant to send a clear signal that his foreign policy
was compassionate as well as tough. Bush pledged that by the end of
2008, PEPFAR-funded programs will have supported antiretroviral drug
treatment for two million people living with HIV/AIDS; will have
prevented seven million new HIV infections; and will have supported
care for ten million people infected with and affected by the disease,
including orphans and vulnerable children.

US government–funded programs routinely set such targets because they
make it easier to evaluate the success or failure of particular
projects; and in attempting to meet the targets, PEPFAR has put
thousands of people on antiretroviral drug treatment.[9] However,
measuring the care of children affected by AIDS is much more difficult
than measuring the number of patients being treated, because there is
no pill that can be given to an abused or neglected child. Thus
"supporting care" can mean many things, including "mentoring"
organizations like Sizanani that do not need it.

The emphasis on "meeting targets" rather than on actually helping
people may well be having a detrimental effect on US-funded AIDS
programs. A number of Hope's counselors have quit in recent years,
because, as one former Hope counselor told Jonathan Cohen and me, the
pressure from PEPFAR to produce numbers made their work all but
impossible. She had worked for Hope for years, and had been devoted to
it, but then something changed when organization officials started
angling for PEPFAR's millions.

"You cannot give quality counseling anymore because PEPFAR has
counseling quotas. If you have to do one thousand people by the end of
the month, you end up not doing good counseling. It compromises
people's dignity. And the stress on people from the paperwork! All the
time we were thinking, 'I have to fill this form because PEPFAR is
coming!' They're not asking 'Are we really meeting the needs of these
people?'"

In order to receive ongoing funding from PEPFAR, organizations like
Hope must meet their targets—however empty. Their predicament reminded
me of Nikolai Gogol's novel Dead Souls, in which the main character, a
minor nobleman named Chichikov, travels through the countryside,
trying to purchase the names of dead serfs from local landowners,
reasoning that landowners would be only too happy to hand over the
names of serfs who had died between one census and another, because
then they wouldn't have to pay taxes on them. Chichikov planned to
mortgage the dead serfs to an unsuspecting bank, which—thinking the
serfs were alive—would give Chichikov a loan with which he could build
a real fortune of his own. Hope's strategy of leveraging the names of
children for future gain seemed to me similar.[10]
2.

What is Hope doing with the $8 million PEPFAR grant if it is not
giving it to organizations like Sizanani? From Hope's Web site, I
learned that shortly after Hope received its grant it established the
ANCHOR program—which stands for African Network for Children Orphaned
and at Risk. According to its Web site, ANCHOR will do the following
things: "promote effective OVC policies"; "provide training and
support for scaling up HIV/AIDS treatment, care and prevention";
"coordinate and facilitate capacity building in communities using
tested community support and mobilization strategies and technical
assistance"; and carry out "monitoring and evaluation to assess
program impact."[11]

I was curious to know what these goals meant in practice. Activities
such as "technical assistance" and "capacity building"—which means
helping organizations to improve management—can help fledgling
community-based groups manage their funding and work more efficiently.
But the same terms can also serve as jargon behind which public health
contractors can hide when donors make impossible demands on them for
political purposes. Such activities can also allow these organizations
to appear to be helping far more people than they actually are.

The ANCHOR program is run by a consortium of organizations, including
Hope and the Rotarian Fellowship for Fighting AIDS (RFFA), a
subsidiary of Rotary International—a private membership organization
that raises money for humanitarian relief projects around the world.
When Hope officials did not reply to my requests for an interview I
contacted Marion Bunch, the Atlanta-based director of RFFA—and one of
the authors of the grant proposal that funded ANCHOR —about Rotary's
role in the program. She said that Rotary was encouraging South
African Rotary Club members to raise funds and solicit donations
locally and abroad. "Sometimes someone will donate one thousand
blankets," she said. "We'll give those directly to people in the
communities. We also fund-raise from local businesses in South Africa,
like a supermarket will give us a food donation, something like that."

"So," I asked, "if Rotary is soliciting donations for food, clothing,
and so on, what is the $8 million PEPFAR grant for?"

"That's in the grant proposal," she said, referring to Hope and
Rotary's application to PEPFAR. "It has direct costs and indirect
costs," and then she suggested I contact USAID if I wanted more
information.

But USAID will not discuss the ANCHOR program. A Freedom of
Information Act request I submitted to USAID in early August 2005 is
still pending.
3.

"We wanted to do something on a huge scale," explained Greg Ash, the
white South African plastic surgeon who founded NOAH—or Nurturing
Orphans of AIDS for Humanity—another South African orphan program that
has received approximately $1.5 million from PEPFAR. "We acted as
though the responsibility for every orphan in the country were ours."
I had been referred to Ash's organization by a press officer at the US
embassy in Pretoria. He said it was a PEPFAR success story—a truly
indigenous South African organization that was helping thousands of
children.

Ash hadn't thought much about AIDS before he started NOAH. Like many
white South Africans, he considered leaving the country after the ANC
came to power in 1994. But then he was offered a job at a private
hospital in Umhlanga Rocks, an exclusive beach community of swaying
palms, oceanfront high-rises, and luxurious shopping malls, and he
decided to stay. Having made a commitment to raise his own children in
South Africa, he began to think more seriously about the country's
future, and that's when he began to worry about AIDS orphans.
"Apartheid," he said, "gave us this feeling about ourselves, like
we're bad people. Maybe that's why an amazing number of people want to
do something for the first time. It's relatively easy to get money for
kids. People are just waiting for someone to tell them what to do." In
2001, he approached officials at the US embassy with a scheme that he
said would help a million AIDS orphans in South Africa by 2008, and in
2003 NOAH began receiving US government funding.

NOAH is a franchise organization. It funds the construction of
"resource centers" in schools—separate buildings that, according to
the plan, house a small library and five or ten computers, where
orphans can stay after school and receive a free meal, read books, and
learn how to use computers. NOAH is currently building twenty-two such
centers—at a cost of roughly $1 million—and the plan is to build many
more.

I asked Ash why it was necessary to build new buildings and buy
computers when so many of the orphans I had met in South Africa seemed
to have much simpler needs. "We need to break the cycle of AIDS and
poverty," he said.

   Many of the schools in South Africa are, frankly, not very good,
but in the future South African kids will have to compete for jobs
with kids from Korea, from Shanghai.... They need that competitive
advantage. And setting up some computers is easy, it doesn't cost
anything, and the kids teach themselves how to use them.

The resource centers have a staff of six people, and local volunteers
are also recruited from the community to work with especially needy
children.

One drizzly Wednesday morning in June 2005, I went to visit a NOAH
center in a poor black township known as Nkobongo some thirty miles
and a world away from Umhlanga Rocks. Nkobongo sprawls over the veldt
behind the town of Shaka's Kraal, named for the powerful Zulu king who
conquered much of southern Africa in the early nineteenth century. By
the early twentieth century, white settlers had forced the Zulus off
the best grazing land into tsetse- and malaria-infested valleys and
lowlands. Young men were recruited to work in the distant gold and
diamond mines of the Transvaal, and the rural economy of small-scale
farming and cattle raising that had sustained the Zulus for centuries
was gradually destroyed. Today, most Zulus live in desolate rural
homelands or impoverished townships like Nkobongo. Staggering levels
of unemployment and poverty have further hardened these tough people.
In village bars, drunk and rowdy men listen to booming rap music,
fight about women, and sometimes kill each other. Even small children
greet each other with gangster hand signals. A study conducted in a
nearby area found that among adults in their twenties, around a third
of all men and half of all women are HIV-positive.

The manager of the local NOAH program was not around when I arrived in
Nkobongo, so I waited for him at the Nkobongo community center. The
community center is on a hill with a view of the whole region: the
neat rows of tiny box-shaped houses spread across barren hillsides, a
latrine in each front yard. Right below the community center, I
noticed that a large crowd had gathered. About two hundred people,
young and old, men and women, were sitting around the periphery of a
rain-soaked tarmac lot. "Those people really appreciate the bones,"
said a woman I had met at the community center. "What bones?" I asked.
Just then, a pickup truck arrived and parked in the middle of the lot.
Two men got out and began off-loading stripped pork bones —refuse from
a local abattoir—which they piled up in a heap on the tarmac. The
crowd looked on keenly as the men began to distribute the bones—five
or six to each person—until the heap disappeared.

Overseeing this extraordinary event was Charles Southwood, a retired
white South African businessman who volunteers to help numerous
charities in the area, including NOAH. He'd been distributing bones
for a local Catholic charity for years, he said. When he started there
would be such a mob when the bones arrived that they knocked Charles
over several times, and almost overturned the vehicle once or twice.
"I told them they had to sit down and form an orderly queue; otherwise
there would be no more bones."

According to the Ministry of Agriculture, roughly one third of all
South Africans experience "food insecurity," meaning that they live in
fear of hunger. At a high school in Soweto, a teacher described to
Jonathan and me how many of the students, especially those who were
orphans, complained that they did not get enough food at home.
Sometimes they would stare through the windows of the faculty room at
the teachers eating lunch. "How do you teach a hungry child?" she
asked us.[12]

South Africa is the richest country in sub-Saharan Africa. There are
no wars here, no refugee camps; the country has a social welfare
system, a free press, and regular peaceful elections. But the agrarian
traditions that once sustained people here—the techniques they had
developed over centuries of survival on the sandy marginal soils of
Africa, and that one nineteenth-century European visitor said showed
such a profound understanding of nature that they closely resembled a
science—have been all but lost.[13] Meanwhile, the industrial future
has yet to arrive, and some three quarters of all adults in places
like Nkobongo are unemployed.[14] Although South Africa's powerhouse
economy, based on gold, diamonds, commercial farming, and services, is
growing rapidly, it produces very small numbers of highly skilled
jobs.

Charles Southwood introduced me to some of the people who worked at
the Nkobongo NOAH resource center. The new building was still under
construction, and the resource center was temporarily housed in a
church. There was no library, although there was a kitchen where a
daily meal was prepared. I was also shown a room with nine computers.
The 150 children registered with NOAH love them, but because demand is
so high, each child is allowed only one hour of computer time every
two weeks. It seemed unlikely that this would break the cycle of AIDS
and poverty that seemed to be churning so rapidly here.

Back in Soweto, Jonathan and I asked Elizabeth what she knew about
NOAH. She said that one of their representatives—a tall white South
African woman—had visited Sizanani some months before. After a series
of meetings the visitor announced that NOAH would begin funding
Sizanani, but in order to obtain the funding Sizanani would have to
fire its entire paid staff and all of them, including Elizabeth, would
have to reapply for their jobs. NOAH would rehire only six of the
twenty-eight staff who worked there. "This is my dream!" she said. "I
wasn't going to let them kick me out!"

Unlike Sizanani, NOAH relies heavily on unpaid volunteers to provide
care for needy children. Ash had hoped that these volunteers—"who are
unemployed anyway," he told me—would serve out of a sense of altruism,
or "Ubuntu" in African terms. But as Elizabeth and Charles Southwood
discovered, this isn't so easy. Few people in this troubled place want
to help AIDS-affected families for free. "They come for a few days,"
Charles said of the volunteers. "Maybe a month. Then they realize
there's no salary and then you never see them again. Sometimes you go
to visit a sick person and the volunteer will just stand at the door
and not go in," he said.

   There's an old black man who lives on his own. He's blind and
can't walk. Someone stole his wallet and pension book. Some volunteers
were supposed to go and feed him, but then I found last week that no
one had been there for three days. Sometimes I think the Zulus think
I'm mad. When I blow my top, as I did last week about the old man,
they fail to understand what I'm angry about. They just don't seem to
care. They aren't kind to each other. I don't know why. I guess
poverty disempowers people, makes them mean.

"Some families don't want my help," a NOAH outreach worker told me.
"Some of them swear at me, chase me away. Sometimes they tell the
children to tell me they aren't there. They embarrass me in front of
the neighbors, say I am some kind of prostitute."

When Charles finds committed volunteers, he tries to raise money to
pay them from local churches or businesses or simply from people he
knows. According to Ash this should have been easy, but Charles hasn't
had much luck. South African businesses may occasionally contribute
food or toys that they can't sell, and they are often keen to donate
funds for buildings and computers and other infrastructure projects
they can put their names or business logos on, but few will support
the salary of a sympathetic human being even if that is what orphans
need most of all. "Most of the white people in our country are totally
unaware of the situation of poor blacks," Charles said. "The whites
around here avoid me; no one wants to know what I am doing."

Before I left South Africa, I tried to visit two other NOAH sites in
KwaZulu-Natal. According to the list I had been given by NOAH
officials in Johannesburg, there should have been two NOAH community
groups in a town called Mtubatuba that I happened to be visiting the
following week. But when I arrived, I was told by a NOAH coordinator
that they were not yet set up. There was not a single volunteer or
community worker I could speak to.

In October 2005, UNICEF will launch a campaign to raise millions of
dollars for AIDS-affected children. UNICEF, the US government, the
World Bank, and many AIDS experts officially recognize the importance
of supporting community-based groups like Sizanani. At present, there
are far too few of these groups, and most of their funding comes from
local sources, often from the poor themselves.[15] The South African
government supports only four such groups in all of Johannesburg, and
there are none at all in many regions of the country. When Jonathan
and I visited the UNICEF officer in charge of OVC issues in Pretoria,
she said she had not had time to visit Sizanani or any of the other
community-based organizations supported by the South African
government. In her view, NOAH provided a better model for orphan
services, although she showed no close acquaintance with its programs.

She repeated a common criticism of community-based organizations—that
they were "unsustainable"—meaning they start with good intentions and
then collapse after a while. Maybe she had a point, but it seemed
hollow to us. Of course these organizations collapse if no one
supports them, or if they are uprooted by larger organizations with
millions of dollars at their disposal. As Elizabeth said, referring to
NOAH's takeover bid,

   When the Americans come, we sing, we dance, they take our picture,
and they go back and show everyone how they are helping the poor black
people. But then all they do is hijack our projects and count our
children.

Notes

[1] About one third of children born to HIV-positive women inherit the
virus during childbirth or breastfeeding. Most of these children die
of AIDS by age five; a very small number are being kept alive for
longer periods with antiretroviral drugs.

[2] Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, "Foreign Aid: An Introductory
Overview of US Programs and Policy," Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, updated January 19, 2005.

[3] See Human Rights Watch, "Letting Them Fail: Barriers to Education
for Children Affected by AIDS," October 2005.

[4] See Helen Epstein, "God and the Fight Against AIDS," The New York
Review, April 28, 2005.

[5] See UNICEF, "Africa's Orphaned Generations," 2003; Human Rights
Watch, "Letting Them Fail"; Takashi Yamano and T.S. Jayne,
"Working-Age Adult Mortality and Primary School Attendance in Rural
Kenya," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 53, No. 3
(2005), pp. 619–654; Anne Case and Cally Ardington, "The Impact of
Parental Death on School Enrollment and Achievement: Longitudinal
Evidence from South Africa," unpublished manuscript, February 7, 2005;
David Evans and Edward A. Miguel, "Orphans and Schooling in Africa: A
Longitudinal Analysis," unpublished manuscript, March 1, 2005; and
Martha Ainsworth, Kathleen Beegle, and Godlike Koda, "The Impact of
Adult Mortality and Parental Deaths on Primary Schooling in
North-Western Tanzania," Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 41, No.
3 (April 2005), pp. 413–415.

[6] See Geoff Foster, "Supporting Community Efforts to Assist Orphans
in Africa," The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 346, No. 24
(June 13, 2002), pp. 1907–1910.

[7] See Case and Ardington, "The Impact of Parental Death on School
Enrollment and Achievement."

[8] Or so said Elizabeth. Hope officials did not return phone calls or
reply to e-mails.

[9] Although perhaps not as many as the US claims. See Craig Timberg,
"Botswana's Gains Against AIDS Put US Claims to Test," Washington Post
Foreign Service, July 1, 2005.

[10] My thanks to Allison Prete for drawing my attention to this.

[11] Mark Ottenweller, "ANCHOR Program in Africa," Hope Worldwide
newsletter 2004, issue 2.

[12] See http://land.pwv.gov.za/publications
/news/speeches/didiza_telefood_concert _2march02.htm.

[13] Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry
(University of California Press, 1979).

[14] See the Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs:
KwaZulu-Natal Province, http://agriculture.kzn
tl.gov.za/dae/index.aspx?ID=4.

[15] See Geoff Foster, Bottlenecks and Drip-feeds: Channeling
Resources to Communities Responding to Orphans and Vulnerable Children
in Southern Africa (Save the Children, June 2005).
DavidT - 13 Oct 2005 17:52 GMT
>You want to help people in Kenya?
>Help them get land reform through their parliament

Is that a suggestion from Mugabe?
Polly Prissypants - 13 Oct 2005 18:25 GMT
DavidT wrote...
>>You want to help people in Kenya?
>>Help them get land reform through their parliament
>
> Is that a suggestion from Mugabe?

Good one!  And not to single out Mugabe, hasn't just about every land
"reform" for the last century ended with millions of people starving
to death?  Russia, China, even Mexico have confiscated land and
redistributed it and the result was always a disaster.
Alex - 15 Oct 2005 13:13 GMT
> >You want to help people in Kenya?
> >Help them get land reform through their parliament
>
> Is that a suggestion from Mugabe?

Actually, unlike you have been led to believe by all the
media bashing of Robert Mugabe, is that land reform
somehow is an issue that is only relevant to Zimbabwe.
Land reform is the one issue the likes of Bob Geldof
remain silent about.

The fact is that the British introduced their aristocratic
pattern of land ownership (huge fenced off estates where
ordinary Black people aren't allowed to enter) to all of
British East and Southern Africa.

South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana,
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya are all
in the situation where the majority of their arable land is
owned by a small, white, colonial elite.
At the same time, they have 40% or higher levels of unemployment
as well as rapid urbanisation, basically because the people do not
have access to farmland.

All these countries have in common, is that only 20% or
less of arable land is under cultivation. Most of it is locked
up by the former colonial elite, with very little of it under cultivation.

For instance, in the case of Zimbabwe, the average Black farmer
works 2 to 3 hectares of land. The average white land owner
owns 2,000 to 3,000 hectares of land, of which 500 hectares
is under cultivation.
Obviously, any individual white farmer will grow a lot more
than any indvidual black farmer, but at the same time, will
have much more land lying fallow. Some have so much land,t
that they only thing they can think of doing with it, is stock it
with wildlife, for tourists to hunt or photograph.

Read more here:

How Kenyans see the land crisis in Zimbabwe

NAIROBI (PANA)-Like hundreds of thousands of his compatriots,
Michael Karanja, who lives on the fringes of one of the large scale
White-owned agricultural farms in Kenya's Thika District, some 30
miles east of Nairobi-has been following with keen interest the
ensuing feud in Zimbabwe between Pres. Robert Mugabe and
White land holders. Mr. Karanja is especially interested in the
European Union's sanctions against Pres. Mugabe.
http://www.finalcall.com/international/zimbabwe03-12-2002.htm

The ugliness (from The New African, by Baffour Ankomah)

Zimbabwe is stunningly ugly when it comes to the ownership
of the land and the economy. It is generally said that 4,500
white commercial farmers own 70% of the best land in the
country. But you have to see it with your own eyes to fully
understand what that 70% translates into. The whites virtually
own the country. The blacks, dispossessed of their land by the
Rhodesians in colonial times, are just mere tenants in their
"own" country.
They don't own the land - the descendants of the mainly British
settlers who arrived in 1890 and pillaged their way across the
country, own it.
They don't own the economy either. According to the records,
black Zimbabweans own 4% of the economy, white Zimbabweans
about 30%, and multi-nationals (mainly British) a whopping 66%.
http://www.swans.com/library/art8/ankomah1.html

http://www.post.co.zm/post-read_article.php?articleId=1745

The Kabanje land wrangle (Zambia)
By Sikota Wina: Tuesday October 04, 2005

A drive to Livingstone through mile after mile of fenced white-owned
commercial farmland without an African village in sight explains why
pressure has begun to mount calling for redress of the land ownership
imbalance in Southern Province.

So it was refreshing that in a statement issued last week following a
familiarisation tour of the province, Commissioner of Lands, Frighton
Sichone, admitted that the province had a land crisis due to the fact
that colonial masters had converted traditional land into state land
and proceeded to sell it to European commercial farmers.

But the ambiguity of government's approach to this problem was
demonstrated by the fact that while the Commissioner of Lands was
issuing this statement, police at Kafue were impounding seven
Lusaka-bound buses from Mazabuka ferrying villagers who were
coming to Lusaka to attend a protest meeting by the Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Association led by Major Robby Chizyuka over
the seizure of Kabanje land sold to investors. For decades, it was
taboo in Zambia to discuss the question of land ownership imbalance,
a problem that has rocked many neighbouring countries, although
we all knew it existed. When it exploded, the Zimbabwe land crisis
took the world by surprise, yet for almost a century, it was simmering
and waiting to happen. Perhaps it shocked the world by its intensity,
but then, how does any sane person fail to question the injustice of the
kind of ownership of land in Zimbabwe where 4,500 white farmers
controlled 75 per cent of the land and the remaining 25 per cent was
occupied by 18 million black Zimbabweans who were the owners
of the land before it was confiscated by white settlers? Namibia was
equally forced in 1996 to launch its own land reform programme to
correct colonial era discrimination in the ownership of land. Here,
about 4,000 mostly white commercial farmers owned half of the
arable land and in 2000, President Nujoma announced plans to
confiscate 192 farms belonging to foreign absentee landlords.

"Namibia is committed to the principle of 'willing buyer, willing
seller', which means no one is forced to sell up their land," Nujoma
declared. "But the landless majority of our citizens are growing
impatient by the day and if these arrogant white farmers and
absent landlords do not embrace the government's policy of
'willing buyer, willing seller' now, it will be too late tomorrow,"
he said.

Since launching the land reform programme in 1996 to correct
colonial era discrimination in land ownership, the Namibian
government has bought a total of 146 commercial farms covering
932,864 hectors resettling a total of 6,000 families. In South Africa,
where 80 per cent of agriculture land is owned by white South
Africans who make up only 10 per cent of the population (the
legacy of apartheid laws), Mbeki's government for the first time
forced a white farmer last month to sell his land. The decision,
announced by the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights
set up to return to black people land they lost under apartheid,
endorses government's policy to hand over about a third of
white-owned farmland to blacks by 2014.

The problem of land ownership imbalance in Southern Province
has been with us for far too long for successive governments not
to have acted.

Understandably, most of the problems connected with the tragedy
of the displacement of the Tonga people from their ancestral lands
were created by the colonial administration.

But even after independence, there was a tendency, which continues
to the present day, for government to grant huge tracts of land in the
heart of our country to other nations to come and develop either
individually or in joint partnership with the government. Libya and
Namibia are the latest cases. The chiefs too have gone on a spree
driven by greed to grant prime lands on riverbanks and lakeshores
to foreign investors for peanuts. All these ignore the fact that land
never expands but the population grows.

The creation of the Kariba Dam in the 1950's to facilitate a huge
hydroelectric supply source led to one of the most traumatic mass
displacements of the Tonga people in modern times. Although the
unpopulated Kafue Gorge was a better alternative for a huge
hydroelectric scheme to supply power to the expanding copper
mines, the white Federal Government in 1955 picked on Kariba,
an ancient home of the Tonga people which was also teeming with
wild game.

I visited Lusitu in Gwembe in 1957 together with other journalists
who had gone to cover the refusal of the people of Gwembe in
middle Zambezi Valley to move their villages from the area that was
being inundated by the rising waters of the Kariba Dam.

Part of the reason they were refusing to move was because the
government had not made adequate alternative settlements for
them to go among the surrounding mountains. In fact, more
attention and money had been spent on the rescue of the thousands
of wild game under an international land and airlift exercise code-named
Operation Noah's Ark.

The government tried to move them by force and in the process police
shot and killed several people and the rest were herded into makeshift
detention camps. This is a chapter which the Tonga people have never
forgotten nor forgiven.

The Tongas are believed to be the original settlers in Zambia, and unlike
the Bemba who originated from Kola and the Ngoni who fled Shaka's
terror in South Africa, there is no record of the tribe having migrated
from anywhere. And because they inhabit one of the most fertile lands
in Zambia, they have always been victims of predatory foreign investors.

With the coming of the British South African Company and the construction
of the railway line from Livingstone to the north through the heart of Tonga
land, the company assumed full powers to deal with all the land and simply
converted all traditional land into crown land and then proceeded to sell it to
European farmers. These crown lands extended five miles on each side of
the railway and this meant that Tongas thus displaced had to move into the
mountains and other lands unsuitable for farming. This created the present
position. To many Tongas, the birth of the Indigenous People's Rights
Association headed by Major Robby Chizyuka seems to be the answer
to the problem of stopping any further seizures of Tonga land, especially
by unscrupulous investors who are attracted to the fertile plateau and the
farm lands which lie at the heart of province.

The association blocked an investor scheme in Mbeza, which could have
deprived the people grazing lands for their cattle. In the current fight in
Mazabuka concerning Kabanje land, the association is challenging Zambia
Sugar Company and former title holder Alice Pyke, calling them squatters
on land originally settled by their ancestors, prompting the company corporate
affairs manager Lovemore Sievu to wonder how many investors would be
rendered useless if people claimed land because it was traced to their ancestors.

The proponents of the principle of seizure of land got a boost from
the visiting South African traditional leader, King Sango Patekile
Holomisa, who is also chairman of the South Africa Development
Community (SADC) Council of Traditional Leaders, who last week
said that the "willing seller, willing buyer" approach to land distribution
had failed in South Africa because white settlers were either reluctant
to sell their land or claimed high charges. As a consequence, he said,
the South African government had amended the law to ensure that the
lands minister had powers to value and relocate land in an event where
the occupant refused to sell it. He dismissed fears that the South African
land reform could escalate into the Zimbabwean situation.

The pressure over land re-distribution as shown in other neighbouring
countries will not subside. To the contrary, it rises and requires careful
handling by government. At the protest meeting in Lusaka held at
Nakatindi Hall last week, Major Robby Chizyuka warned: "The issue
of repossessing land has begun. We cannot have a situation where one
white family has 14 farms from Kafue to Mazabuka".

The solution to that problem does not lie in government officials boycotting,
as they did recently during tours of the Southern Province, meetings of
Indigenous Peoples Rights Association to which they were invited. The
issue of land is too important to be handled in such a cavalier manner.
Neither does it lie in the impounding of buses ferrying affected Tonga
villagers to protest meetings. It lies in recognising the problem and, like
Namibia did, adopt the "willing buyer, willing seller" policy and begin
buying some land for distribution among the Tongas.

The fact that it failed in South Africa does not necessarily mean
that it will fail here.
Alex - 15 Oct 2005 20:19 GMT
http://www.caledonia.org.uk/land/zimbabwe.htm

Mugabe Is Right About Land Reform
David Anderson
This article was published in the Comments Section of The Independent, 4 May 2000

Contents
Background
Land and the Colonial Past
African Agriculture Confined to Native Reserves
Independence, Land Redistribution and the Peace Settlement
Thatcher's Government Springs a Surprise
The Bargaining Counter - Development Aid but No Land Reform
Kenyan's Million-acre Scheme Provides the Model
The Failure of the Kenyan Model
Britain Created the Land Problem
British Ministers may Huff and Puff
Further Information

Background

There's nothing new under the sun. Not even in Zimbabwe. Robin Cook
may have cajoled the Commonwealth into joining Britain in admonishing
Robert Mugabe's government, but it is doubtful that many members of the
Commonwealth share Mr Cook's enthusiasm for building pressure against
Zimbabwe. Many African leaders, in particular, will agree with Mr Mugabe's
contention that he is merely seeking to right the wrongs of history. For
Mr Mugabe, the land question is the last colonial question, and it is one
he now intends to resolve, whether Mr Cook likes it or not.

http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=61

Backgrounder-Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe
January 21, 2003

Over the past two years or so, land has stormed onto the Southern African regional
agenda, thanks largely to developments in Zimbabwean land reform. The media in
particular has latched onto these developments, overwhelmingly with a negative
sentiment. This negativity has largely clouded the real situation, and obscured
important and valid grievances - namely the unresolved land issue which
underpins much of the structural inequality characteristic of the country.

Tom Lebert
National Land Committee   (More from this organization)
Johannesburg, South Africa

1. Introduction

Over the past two years or so, land has stormed onto the Southern African
regional agenda, thanks largely to developments in Zimbabwean land
reform. The media in particular (regionally and internationally) has
latched onto these developments, overwhelmingly with a negative
sentiment. This negativity has largely clouded the real situation,
and obscured important and valid grievances - namely the unresolved
land issue which underpins much of the structural inequality
characteristic of the country (and in fact the broader region).

This short paper sets out to provide a broad sketch of the land question
in Zimbabwe. It starts with a short introduction to the history of
colonisation, before focussing in greater detail on processes of land
reform during the post-independence period (i.e. post-1980). The
paper is essentially descriptively outlining the approaches used,
although it does provide some analysis of the problems associated
with market-assisted reforms and how these have influenced the nature
of land policy over the past two decades. The paper does not enter
into discussion on whether the politicisation of the land issue by
ZANU-PF's is altruistic and ideological in nature, or simply the
pursuit of self-preservation. The more detailed analysis to follow
this study will delve into this matter.

Finally, this paper is by no means exhaustive and it contains many omissions
and gaps. It really only scratches the surface of what is a complex
issue.. However, this document highlights some key aspects of land
and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe..

2. Background to the Land Question in Zimbabwe

2.1. Colonisation: The British South Africa Company

Although there are many similarities in relation to the history of land in
South Africa and Zimbabwe, the underlying conditions are different.
Unlike South Africa, Zimbabwean colonisation only started in the
1890's, when the 'pioneer column' of John Cecil Rhodes crossed north
over the Limpopo. This movement north of European settlers was
spurred-on by massive gold discoveries on the Rand (now
Johannesburg) in South Africa in the 1870's. 'Gold hunger' led mining
capital to explore for further rich gold fields. These explorations
penetrated as far inland as the Zimbabwe highlands, where gold was
indeed discovered.

The British South Africa Company (BSA) - a commercial company - had
obtained concessions from the British Crown to further the
exploitation of minerals in the region. The Company sponsored the
settlement of Europeans at what was then Fort Salisbury (now Harare),
where land was -separated and laid out as farms. It needs to be noted
that the BSA did not set out to govern or rule the territory. It's
sole objective was to seek and generate profit from the natural
resources discovered there. Unfortunately, profits were not to be,
since the gold discovered in Zimbabwe was not concentrated in reefs
(as in South Africa), but rather was scattered and almost impossible
to extract profitably. In fact, even after three decades the company
never generated any profit.

As a result of the company being unable to profit from gold exploitation,
the BSA encouraged white settlement for farming purposes. This was
seen as an alternative means of generating income for the company. As
a result of this policy however, there was a greater need to
dispossess indigenous peoples of even more land, and coercively force
them into labour on settler farms.

Within the first decade of European settlement in Zimbabwe, African people
rebelled against the forced alienation of their lands. The first
'Chimurenga' erupted in 1896 as locals attempted through armed
struggle to drive the settlers out, and to reclaim their territory.
This rebellion lasted until1897, but ultimately failed as Africans
were defeated by European weaponry.

The Zimbabwean highlands, much like the highlands in South African,
lands, are not particularly fertile, and thus farming was not an easy
or profitable enterprise. As a result, white settler farmers
struggled continuously through the early decades of the 20th
Century.

2.2. Settler Consolidation: The emergence of a British Colony proper

By 1923 the BSA Company wanted out of the territory. Profits had
remained elusive over the past three decades. As a result, an
election/referendum was held for white settlers only to determine the
future of the territory. Settlers were required to vote for one of
three choices: to become a part of the Union of South Africa; to
become a full British colony; or to go for self-governance (an
autonomous British colony). Settlers opted for the self-governance
route.

Shortly after the election/referendum the Morris-Carter Commission of 1925
was established to set out a framework for ensuring the emergence of
Rhodesia as a self-sustaining white colony. The Commission proposed
landholding patterns to put the settler economy on a sound footing.
This was followed by the Land Appointment Act of 1930, which
separated land along racial lines (both in terms of quality and
quantity). Race groups were not allowed to acquire land in areas
designated for other races. This land structure has largely carried
through into the post-independence period.

In terms of the Land Appointment Act, 50.8 per cent of the land was
reserved for white settlers, with the bulk of it on the arable
central highlands. The indigenous African population (the majority of
the population) was allocated 30 per cent of the land. This 30 per
cent was largely on the plateau sloping down into the Zambezi Valley,
and in the mountainous Escarpment regions. This land was designated
as African Reserve Areas (now known as communal areas). The remaining
20 per cent of the land was either owned by commercial companies or
the colonial government (Crown Land), or was reserved as conservation
areas. A further, very small area (0.05 per cent), the Native
Purchase Areas, allowed the acquisition of land (through freehold or
leasehold) by richer Africans or small groups of African people.

It does need to be noted that the size of land available for Africans
did expand between 1930 and 1980. By Zimbabwean independence, the
racial split in land ownership/access was approximately 40% for each
group (i.e. white holdings were reduced from 51 to 40 per cent, and
African land expanded from 30 to 40 per cent). Population densities
in white and African areas were however vastly different (with far
greater numbers of people living on African land). This situation
still prevails today.

It is important to note however, that not only did white settlers have the
pick of land in the best agro-ecological regions of the country, but
were also supported by massive state intervention in the development
of the farming economy. Thus, the colonial state provided extensive
communication and marketing infrastructure in commercial farming
areas, and made subsidies and loans available to white farmers.

At the time, there was a definite wage hierarchy in the sub-region, which
corresponded largely to differing levels of capital development in
Southern Africa. Within this hierarchy, South African wages for
migrant labourers were the highest (followed by Zimbabwe and then
Malawi). As a result, labour migration in the sub-region had a
southward tendency. This posed problems in terms of labour supply to
the emerging white colony in Zimbabwe, where (as the white economy
grew) the need to 'keep' local African labour grew more urgent. As a
result, various measures were put in place, including a labour supply
commission; limiting access by South African recruitment companies;
the use of migrant labour from Malawi; and the setting of limits on
the number of Zimbabweans allowed to leave the colony.

As a consequence of increasing population densities in the communal
areas, and the social and economic dislocation associated with labour
migration from these areas, by the post-war period there was
increasing environmental degradation and a growing production crisis.
This was compounded by the massive eviction of African labour off
white farms at that time (in response to increasing mechanisation of
commercial agriculture). As a result, in 1951 the Native Land
Husbandry Act was passed. Central to this legislation (and also
common to many other British colonies in Africa at the time) was the
limiting of stock numbers and the introduction of soil and water
conservation methods and technology (for example, terracing). The
betterment schemes in South Africa's reserves from the 1930's and
onward were in a similar vein, and in response to a similar
environmental and production crisis.

The outcome of this institutionalised segregation and structured
subordination of indigenous peoples is reflected in data from the
1960's, including population densities, average wages and educational
expenditure by race:

Table 1 Racial inequality in 1960's Rhodesia

EUROPEAN AFRICAN

Population density
1/square mile 46/square mile

Average wages
£1200/month £ 110/month

Educational Expenditure
£ 340/child £ 30/child

(Source: Moyo, 2001; Mbaya, 2001)

It is therefore not surprising that the iniquities and inequalities of
land allocation, and the associated state support to white
agriculture were continuous areas of conflict and contention. As
noted earlier, the first rebellion by indigenous peoples was fuelled
by these grievances. In the mid-1960's, the second Chimurengabegan,
led by ZANU and ZAPU. Both of these liberation movements were
committed to radical land reform on coming to power. The
dispossession of Africans was still very much a living memory for
many of the elders in Zimbabwe who had lived through . the first
Chimurenga. As a result, ZANU and ZAPU elicited much peasant support,
and the war was thus fought largely in rural areas. Trade unions and
civil organisations were not involved.Rather, it was guerrilla
fighters and peasants who battled against a modern army of the white
regime. It was a struggle for land on the land.

The civil war lasted for nearly two decades before negotiations for a
settlement were initiated in the late-1970's. The inequalities in
Zimbabwe at that time were still very stark. Population densities in
the communal areas were three times those in commercial farming
areas. There was still a highly visible racial division of land, with
6000 white farmers owning approximately 42 per cent of the country

2.3. Independence: The Lancaster House Agreement

In
terms of seeking a resolution to the crisis in Zimbabwe at the time,
the land reform experience of Kenya was influential. As with
Zimbabwe, Kenya had had a comparable land problem and a guerrilla war
fuelled by land grievances. In the case of Kenya, the British sought
to defuse the situation by buying out white farmers. The British made
available UK£ 500 million for land acquisition and settlement
support in Kenya. It was hoped that a similar solution could be found
for Zimbabwe. Thus, during the secret negotiations in the
mid-1970's, the notion of an Anglo-American Development Fund for
Zimbabwe was promoted. The endowment" received broad support
(including backing from the then ZANU/ZAPU Patriotic Front). This
fund, to which the British agreed to contribute UK£ 75 million,
would be used to buy out farms owned by whites. At the time, the US
hinted it would contribute an extra $200 million to the fund.
However, as we will see in the following pages, this Fund failed to
materialise.

In 1979, the Lancaster House negotiations started. By the time these
negotiations took place there had been a change in government in the
UK. During Lancaster, the Development Fund, which had been moot in
previous discussions, was used as 'bait' to get the liberation
movements to reach an agreement with the Rhodesian authorities. In
the end however, the offer of the Fund was withdrawn, and instead the
UK government offered a compromise solution. In exchange for
guaranteeing existing property rights in the new Zimbabwe, the UK
would underwrite half of the costs of resettlement. The Zimbabwe
government had to match that funding to make up the full costs of the
programme. In 1980, the UK pledged an initial amount of UK£ 20
million.

Land would thus change hands through a willing seller/willing buyer
mechanism, with white farmers who wanted to continue farming being
free to do so. There would be no mass expropriation of land by the
new post-colonial state. The state did retain the right to
expropriate for public and resettlement purposes, but in such cases
compensation had to be paid out in foreign currency. In the end,
following pressure from the frontline states, ZANU/ZAPU conceded and
accepted the settlement. The restrictions imposed by Lancaster were
to remain in place for 10 years.

As a result of this "crucial capitulation" (Palmer,
1990:166), the hands of the new Zimbabwean government were
effectively tied in relation to agrarian transformation, and
effectively ruled out any significant redistribution of land.
Compounding these restrictions was the fact that following the war
there was an urgent need for reconstruction, and measures to address
mass displacement and the collapse of peasant production. Moreover,
as a result of the collapse of peasant agriculture, 90 per cent of
the countries marketed food requirements were being produced by white
farmers. This ironically placed white farmers in a strong position
(economically and politically) at the end of the war. The
restrictions imposed through the Lancaster House agreement remained a
constant theme in Zimbabwean land reform in the decades following
independence.

3. Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe2

The aim of land reform in post-independence Zimbabwe was to redress past
land alienation through promoting equal access to land for the
majority of the population. The aims of the programme were:

(i) To create political stability and an acceptable property rights regime;

(ii) To promote economic growth through wider equity and efficiency gains
from land redistribution; and

(iii) To promote national food security, self-sufficiency and agricultural
development through labour intensive small farmer production, optimal
land productivity, and returns to capital invested.

The land reform programme was targeted at the landless; war veterans;
the poor; and commercial farm workers.

The target for resettlement on land acquired by the state changed a
number of times in the first two years of independence. In 1980 the
stated target was 18 000 households over five years. This changed in
1981 to 54 000 households before finally, in 1982, the target was
fixed at 162 000 households (to be resettled by 1984 if possible).
This final target has stuck, and proved to be a millstone around the
government's neck.

Land acquisition was aimed at reducing the 16 million hectares of
agricultural land held by white farmers at independence by
approximately 50 per cent. The target set for land acquisition and
transfer to black small landholders was thus approximately 8 million
hectares. The remaining white commercial farming areas would also be
desegregated through promoting black entry into the sector.

The Land Reform and Resettlement Programme of the Zimbabwean government
can be seen as comprising two phases: the first phase from 1980 to
1996, and the second commencing with the gazetting of 1471 farms for
compulsory acquisition in 1997.

3.1.
State-Centred Market-Based Land Reform: 1980 to 1996

.State centred land reform

The dominant approach to land acquisition in the 1981-1996 period can be
characterised as a state-centred market-based approach to land
redistribution. Land was purchased by the state from willing sellers
(as per Lancaster) and redistributed to beneficiaries3.
The private sector led the identification of land and controlled the
supply available for resettlement, with the government being a
reactive buyer. The government made land available to people selected
mainly by its district officials under the direct supervision of
central government officials.

As a consequence, land reform in Zimbabwe during the 1980's and 1990's
has been unable to redistribute land on any significant scale. Instead,
reform has been confined to the planned and orderly settlement of
beneficiaries (families and cooperatives) on land acquired by the
state.

Acquisition of land through the willing-seller set-up was relatively easy during
the 1981 to 1983 period, with a substantial supply of farms abandoned
during the war, and farms coming on to the market as white settlers
left after independence. However, after this period the supply of
land dried up. This may well have been the motivation behind the Land
Acquisition Act of 1986, which provided the state with first option
to farms coming onto the market. The Act also provided for compulsory
acquisition of land deemed under-utilised or derelict (although this
approach was never successfully pursued during the first phase of
land reform in Zimbabwe).

Settlement of beneficiaries on land took place through one of four models
(although the bulk of reform took place through only one):

(i)
Intensive settlement on an individual family basis (MODEL A)

In this model, beneficiaries receive cropping land (of 10 to 65 Ha) as
well as access to communal grazing land (of 55 Ha or equivalent
depending on the agro-ecological region). Land was acquired by the
state (usually in the form of large commercial estates) with plots
being redistributed to beneficiaries. Tenure (on the part of
beneficiaries) was in the form of three annual permits - one
for settlement, one for cultivation, and one for grazing. A final
point is that settlers (beneficiaries) had to give up their rights
to land in the trust/communal areas they came from. The bulk of land
reform (over 80 per cent) in the 1980's and 1990's took place
through this model.

(ii)
Village settlement with cooperative farming (MODEL B)

Model
B was designed to take over existing large commercial farms, with
farm production then being cooperatively organised (with
decision-making through committee). Credit would be accessed by the
cooperative, and income allocated either to individual families or
allocated for farm development. Approximately 50 of these
cooperative schemes were set up, although many subsequently folded.

(iii)
State farms with out-growers (MODEL C)

This
model involved the intensive resettlement of beneficiaries around a
core estate. The estate provided settlers with certain services, and
settlers in turn provide labour for the estate. Cropping land within
this scheme was allocated on an individual basis, with settlers also
gaining access to grazing land, which is managed communally. A
professional farm manager manages the core estate. This model was
not extensively implemented.

(iv)
Commercial grazing for communal areas (MODEL D)

Under
Model D (which was implemented in the arid south of Zimbabwe),
commercial ranches were purchased next to communal land. Livestock
was then purchased from these neighbouring trust areas and allowed
to fatten on the ranch before being sold. The thinking was that this
would enable communal farmers to reduce grazing pressure on communal
lands. This model was not extensively implemented.

On the
whole, land allocations through the Zimbabwean land reform programme
have been generous as compared to other African countries such as
Kenya. This is partly due to the fact that the programme was modelled
on the extensive land use patterns characteristic of the (white)
commercial sector. The down side of this is that less people have
been able to benefit from land redistribution (i.e. the number of
potential beneficiaries is reduced).

By
June 1989, approximately 52 000 households (or 416 000 people) had
been resettled, on approximately 2.8 million hectares of land
acquired by the state for resettlement. This represented
approximately 16 per cent the commercial farmland at independence.4
In 1989, there were 4319 black and white commercial farmers occupying
approximately 29 per cent of the land. By 2000, the amount of land
redistributed had increased to approximately 3.5 million hectares,
and the number of beneficiaries to approximately 75 000 households. A
further 400 000 hectares of state land had been leased out to 400
African commercial farmers, and a further 350 farms had been
purchased by Africans on the open market.

The
acquisition of land was however not evenly spread out over time. The
process was extremely uneven as is illustrated in Table 2 below.

Table 2 Land purchased for resettlement: 1980/1981 - 1987/1988

FINANCIAL YEAR

LAND (Ha)
1980/1981 223 196
1981/1982 900 196
1982/1983 939 925
1983/1984 159 866
1984/1985   75 058
1985/1986   85 167
1986/1987 133 515
1987/1988   20 319

TOTAL (1988) 2 538 262
TOTAL (1989) 2 713 725
TOTAL (2000)  approx. 3 500 000
(Source: Palmer, 1990. Modified)

From the data, it is obvious that in addition to uneven progress, there
has been a general slow-down in progress of the programme over time
as well. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure
1 Land Acquisition: 1980 to 2000

There
are a number of factors that have contributed to the imbalance
observed in the programme, as well as the general slow-down in land
redistribution over time:

(i)
from 1980/1981 to 1982/1983 there was a massive spurt of
redistribution made up largely of farms abandoned during the war or
shortly before or after independence;

(ii)
after 1983 few whole farms came onto the market, which made advance
planning on the part of the government difficult. Moreover, farmers
held onto their core productive land and sold of marginal holdings.
This was especially the case as land prices began to rise due
largely to post-war political stability;

(iii)
white farmers wanting to sell land were legally obliged to offer it
to the state first. If the state did not want the land, it would
issue a 'no present interest' certificate (valid for one year),
which then enabled the seller to dispose of the land on the private
market. According to Palmer (1990), throughout the 1980's at least
there was a consistent oversupply of land available to the state.
Many of the new black elite and senior members of the government
were able to acquire farms through taking advantage of the state's
'no present interest'. According to Palmer (1990), farm land
totalling over a million hectares transferred hands in this way.

(iv)
the role of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) cannot be overlooked
in examining the pace of land reform. The CFU has been a prominent
player in relation to the land issue in Zimbabwe, and has
consistently argued that rapid land reform would undermine white
confidence and threaten export earnings and employment. The
inclusion of at least 10 government ministers and over 500 black
members in 1989 (Palmer, 1990) no doubt bolstered their position.
The Union was largely responsible for ensuring that the position of
commercial farmers remained secure (at least up to the 1990's),
through courting government over a range of issues. Through having
the ear of the Ministry of Land and Agriculture (as well as
influence in the seven other ministries involved in resettlement)
the CFU was able to successfully slow the pace of resettlement.

(v)
by 1983 already there was increasing pressure on the domestic budget
of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government came under increasing
pressure from the World Bank and the IMF, as well as western donor
governments, to undertake belt-tightening. The government complied
by cutting back on resettlement (but continues with funding to newly
established schools and clinics).

(vi)
in the mid-1980's there was severe drought in the sub-region, which
was particularly hard-hitting in Zimbabwe. As a result some new
settlers returned to communal areas in search of better conditions.
The government of Zimbabwe also used extensive resources on relief.

.People-driven
land reform

Although
characterised as state-centred and market-based, the 1980 to 1996
period did see people-driven acquisitions as well (what Moyo, 2001:24
refers to as a "community land occupation approach"). This
was especially so in the first four years, where peoples action was
closely linked to the government programme itself (in the form of the
'accelerated resettlement programme'). Under this approach,
communities drove land identification through occupation of abandoned
and under-utilised lands, with government following and purchasing
this land at market price. Most of the land acquired in this manner
was in the liberation war zone of the Eastern Highlands.

By 1986 however, the government had moved to end this practice.
Occupations were now deemed illegal and both police and farmers
evicted occupiers. Occupations (and land redistribution in general)
slowed dramatically after 1986. Occupations slowed during the period
which followed (although never disappeared entirely), until
re-emerging strongly again from around 1996.

.Issues
in relation to Market-Based Land Acquisition

The
experience of market-based land acquisition over the 1980's and
1990's throws up three key issues:

(i)
the amount, quality, location and cost of land are driven by
landholders (and their own interests);

(ii) neither the government nor
beneficiaries drive the process in terms of their needs; and

(iii) the state being the key buyer
of land distorts the land market through setting parameters in terms
of pricing and location (as determined by the government's broader
settlement planning framework).

As a
consequence, over 70 per cent of land acquired for resettlement
through the market has been agro-ecologically marginal and located
mainly in the drier, more climatically erratic, southern regions of
the country. The bulk of prime land in the three Mashonaland
provinces (covering the central highlands) has largely been
untouched. The land offered to the state has been geographically
scattered, and thus moving settlers from communal areas to isolated
farms in small groups was both expensive and logistically
inefficient.

.Conflict
with donors

As noted earlier, the conditionalities imposed by Lancaster, have been a
central issue of contention in Zimbabwe, and has been especially
significant in shaping the relationship between the government of
Zimbabwe and the UK. This section explores this issue in more detail.

The 1980's

Conflict between the Government of Zimbabwe and the UK is rooted
in the conditionalities imposed by the UK (and later other multi-lateral
agencies) on financial support to the land reform programme. In
terms of the programme in Zimbabwe, the UK laid down strict
conditions, including detailed planning and surve
Polly Prissypants - 13 Oct 2005 18:22 GMT
Alex wrote...
> You want to help people in Kenya?
>
[quoted text clipped - 4 lines]
> is that farming people do not have access to land or own
> their own land. After that comes access to mechanical equipment.

And who's going to fix the mechanical equipment when it breaks?
This is a group of people from the Stone Age, I don't think they
even have learned how to forge iron to make horse-drawn plows,
and you think they'll be able to handle tractors and combines?
 
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