Medical Forum / Diseases and Disorders / AIDS / May 2005
Diagnostic test claims were riddled by holes, probe says
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PaulKing - 04 May 2005 20:53 GMT U.S. INQUIRY DISCREDITS GALLO ON AIDS PATENT Diagnostic test claims were riddled by holes, probe says
By John Crewdson
Chicago Tribune 19 June 1994
A two-year inquiry by the inspector general's office of the Department of Health and Human Services has found no evidence to support Dr. Robert C. Gallo's claim that he was the original inventor of the widely used diagnostic blood test for AIDS.
Nor has the inquiry, a summary of which was obtained by the Tribune, provided support for the government's position that it is entitled, on the strength of Gallo's AIDS test research, to the lion's share of the millions of dollars in annual royalties paid by companies that make and sell the test.
Although the summary, like most federal investigative reports, contains no conclusions, it notes that the patent examiner who granted HHS the 1985 patent on Gallo's AIDS test told investigators she would not have done so had she known that French scientists already had developed such a test.
The patent examiner was among more than 50 scientists and former and current government officials questioned during the most extensive inquiry thus far into the circumstances surrounding the Franco-American dispute over Gallo's decade-old claim of having invented the AIDS test and discovered the virus from which it is made.
According to the summary, the patent examiner acknowledged that "had she been aware of (the French AIDS test research) at the time she examined the blood test application of Gallo, she would have suspended prosecution of the Gallo application interference" between Gallo's application and one filed months earlier by the French.
The summary notes that Gallo, who heads a research laboratory at the National Cancer Institute, failed to tell the Patent Office that scientists at the Pasteur Institute of Paris already had performed "extensive work" with the AIDS virus and had used it to make an AIDS blood test of their own.
Despite a legal obligation to disclose all information "material" to his claim of inventorship, the summary says, Gallo failed to inform the Patent Office that his laboratory had cultured the French AIDS virus, called LAV, "for an extended period and used it for many of their experiments."
According to the summary, Gallo later told investigators his assertions were untrue. "There is a point where I say I didn't grow LAV," Gallo is quoted as having acknowledged. "And, of course, LAV was grown."
The 35-page inspector general's summary, which provides a detailed chronology to "bring focus" to Gallo's statements and actions, includes a number of key statements attributed to Gallo -some made under oath-that are contradicted by evidence gathered in the inquiry.
According to the summary, after the dispute arose in 1985, HHS officials insisted that Gallo, not Pasteur, had been "first to identify the virus and to describe the virus antibody test."
The inquiry leaves little question, however, that Pasteur scientists were first to discover the AIDS virus, to isolate it successfully from several AIDS patients, to describe it in a scientific article, and to use it to make a diagnostic blood test for antibodies to the AIDS virus.
The summary also notes that more than a month before Gallo applied for the patent, another HHS agency, the Centers for Disease Control, informed Gallo that the French AIDS test was as accurate as his own at detecting AIDS virus antibodies in blood samples from AIDS patients.
In briefs filed with the Patent Office, HHS lawyers later dismissed the fact that Pasteur had sent Gallo a sample of its newly discovered AIDS virus as having had "no significance" for Gallo's research.
The summary asserts, however, that someone in Gallo's lab simply renamed the French virus, changing its designation from LAV to MOV, and continued to use it in the experiments that led to the development of Gallo's blood test.
The AIDS isolate Gallo later called HTLV-3B, the virus with which the U.S. version of the AIDS test is still manufactured, also has been shown to be the French virus LAV.
The AIDS test, one of the government's few lucrative inventions, has produced at least $20 million in royalties for HHS since 1987, compared with $14 million for Pasteur during the same period. Gallo has so far received more than $700,000 from the sale of the AIDS test in addition to his government salary.
The French first began to seek an expanded share of the AIDS test royalties in 1991, after Gallo admitted that HTLV-3B is really LAV-the result, he said, not of any misappropriation but of an "accidental contamination" in his laboratory.
The inspector general's report, however, states, "The claim that 3B was contaminated by LAV comes into question since there appears to be no evidence there ever was a 3B to be contaminated."
The formula for dividing the AIDS test royalties, which the French want to redraw, was worked out as part of a settlement announced by President Ronald Reagan and French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in 1987, when far less was known about Gallo's AIDS test research.
In its chronological presentation of facts, for example, the inspector general's summary confirms a central complaint made by the French, most recently in a letter sent last week by Maxime Schwartz, the Pasteur Institute's director, to Dr. Harold Varmus, who heads the National Institutes of Health.
"The French test kit was developed in the absence of any input from the American scientists," Schwartz told Varmus, "whereas there is no evidence that the American test could have been developed if the American scientists had not received the French virus."
The French, initially angry that Gallo took credit for their discoveries after they provided him with their new-found virus and related materials, now assert that they were deliberately misled by the Reagan administration about the facts of the case.
In last week's letter to Varmus, Schwartz declared, "A cover- up of the true facts was deliberately undertaken so that we would settle." He said the French could no longer "abide by a sharing of royalties based on what would appear as a previous administration's deliberate fabrication."
Although HHS has so far refused to entertain the French appeal, that position may become more difficult to maintain in the face of the inspector general's summary. An NIH official said Varmus could not be reached for comment on his reaction to the inspector general's report.
Sources familiar with the inspector general's inquiry said that although Gallo, as a prospective inventor, had a legal obligation to tell the Patent Office about the Pasteur's research on the AIDS test and his own work with the French virus, the Patent Office had to share responsibility for improperly granting Gallo the patent.
The examiner who handled the Gallo patent, one source said, told investigators she hadn't known until after the Gallo patent was granted that the French had filed their own application months ahead of Gallo. The examiner blamed the mix- up on a breakdown in Patent Office tracking procedures.
Among the items never brought to the examiner's attention, the sources said, was a scientific article, published two weeks before the Gallo application was filed, in which Pasteur scientists provided the first description of the blood test for AIDS.
Earlier this year, federal prosecutors decided not to bring criminal charges against Gallo, citing what the inspector general's summary calls "several obstacles, jurisdictional concerns and procedural rules governing criminal prosecution," including the five-year federal statute of limitations.
The prosecutors advised the inspector general in the same letter, however, that their decision did not mean they believed Gallo "should continue to receive . . . annual royalty payments" from the AIDS test. One source close to the prosecutors said the language had been added to the letter "for a reason."
The inspector general's inquiry, which encompasses events from 1983 to 1994, was far broader than an earlier HHS investigation that had been limited to a single 1984 article in which Gallo reported his discovery of the AIDS virus.
That investigation concluded Gallo deliberately "misstated the role that the French virus . . . played in his work with the AIDS virus" by removing all references in the article to his assistants' use of LAV and then inserting a sentence claiming that LAV had never been successfully cultured.
Those investigators reluctantly withdrew their misconduct charges last November, saying that, while they had not changed their opinion about the facts, they did not believe they could get a fair hearing from the government appeals board that decides cases of science fraud.
Despite the withdrawal of the misconduct finding, the Gallo case has continued to smolder "like an underground fire that won't go out," as the authoritative newsletter, Science & Government Report, described it last month.
The publication quoted Frederick Richards, the Yale University professor who headed a blue-ribbon committee of scientists that oversaw the misconduct investigation, as calling for a reopening of the misconduct inquiry based on evidence that had emerged since the withdrawal.
Among other items, Richards referred to the recent discovery by congressional investigators of a 1987 computer analysis, by scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, showing that Gallo's HTLV-3B was merely Pasteur's LAV by another name.
A memo from those scientists, written to senior NIH officials just nine days after the Franco-American settlement was announced, said the government's assertions that Gallo had made an independent discovery amounted to a "double fraud."
"The major purpose of this whole investigation," Richards was quoted as saying, "was to find out whether they stole the virus. The answer is, they stole the virus. But we didn't know that at the time."
The first indication that the Gallo matter was not concluded in the eyes of NCI and NIH came last April, at a congressional hearing on fraud in government-sponsored breast cancer research.
The NCI's director, Dr. Samuel Broder, who had earlier ordered the removal of Dr. Bernard Fisher of the University of Pittsburgh as chief of the nation's largest breast cancer research group, was asked whether he applied the same standards of fitness and suitability to NCI's own scientists, particularly Gallo.
Broder replied that "the issues involving Dr. Gallo have until recently been complicated by a formal inquiry process," a reference to the misconduct investigation. Broder said he had been "awaiting the results of that process" before reviewing "the situation and the facts of Dr. Gallo's case."
Last month Broder sent Gallo a list of questions about his early AIDS research that had not been addressed by either the misconduct investigation or the inspector general's inquiry. Broder gave Gallo until the end of May to produce the answers.
One question concerned an article Gallo published in 1985, just as the dispute with the French was taking shape, in which he claimed to have produced his first confirmed isolate of the AIDS virus in "the fall of 1982"-several months before the French first isolated their AIDS virus in January 1983.
In addition to asking Gallo to provide data supporting that claim, Broder asked him to document the source of the AIDS virus isolate which Gallo called MOV, and which the inspector general's summary says merely was a new name given to LAV.
A source close to Broder and Gallo, who spoke only on condition of anonymity, said Gallo had been unable to provide the requested documentation for his purported 1982 discoveries, to identify the origin of MOV or to answer many of the other questions.
Last Monday, the Charleston, S.C., Post and Courier reported that Gallo was being "courted" by the Medical University of South Carolina, which has its headquarters there.
The university's cancer research center is headed by Dr. Peter Fischinger, one of Gallo's former NCI superiors. Fischinger is mentioned in the inspector general's summary as one of the officials who helped delay publication of data showing that Gallo's HTLV-3B was genetically identical to LAV.
The article quoted Gallo as saying he was "listening" to offers from the university and had "cut the umbilical cord with the National Institutes of Health," which he described as "not quite what it used to be. There is not quite the joy of life there now."
The university's president, James B. Edwards, who served as secretary of energy in the Reagan administration, told the newspaper he would "like very much" for Gallo to work there. I would like him to be working in our lab when he gets the Nobel laureate," Edwards said.
The newspaper noted that the university currently is cutting back on staff, but suggested that lack of funds would not be an obstacle to its recruitment of Gallo. It said Edwards noted that " Gallo's HIV test patent alone brings in millions, and his work would quickly pay its own way." *
GMCarter - 05 May 2005 00:41 GMT >U.S. INQUIRY DISCREDITS GALLO ON AIDS PATENT >Diagnostic test claims were riddled by holes, probe says > >By John Crewdson > >Chicago Tribune 19 June 1994 ...and it's now 2005--and this doesn't dispute the specificity or sensitivity of HIV tests but rather who should materially benefit. One of the more disgusting aspects of medical care....
George M. Carter
PaulKing - 05 May 2005 03:10 GMT Unreliable Tests
A September 2004, San Francisco Chronicle article considered the "beauty" of testing. It told the story of 59 year-old veteran Jim Malone, who'd been told in 1996 that he was HIV positive. His health was diagnosed as "very poor." He was classified as "permanently disabled and unable to work or participate in any stressful situation whatsoever."
In 2004, his doctor sent him a note to tell him he was actually negative. He had tested positive at one hospital, and negative at another.
Nobody asked why the second test was more accurate than the first (this was the protocol at the Veteran's Hospital). Having been falsely diagnosed and spending nearly a decade waiting, expecting to die, Malone said, "I would tell people to get not just one HIV test, but multiple tests. I would say test, test and retest."
In the article, AIDS experts assured the public that the story was "extraordinarily rare." But the medical literature differs significantly.
The Numbers
In 1985, at the beginning of HIV testing, it was known that "68% to 89% of all repeatedly reactive ELISA (HIV antibody) tests [were] likely to represent false positive results." (New England Journal of Medicine. 1985).
In 1992, the Lancet reported ("HIV Screening in Russia") that for 66 true positives, there were 30,000 false positives. And in pregnant women, "there were 8,000 false positives for 6 confirmations."
In September 2000, the Archives of Family Medicine stated that the more women we test, the greater "the proportion of false-positive and ambiguous (indeterminate) test results."
The tests described above are standard HIV tests, the kind promoted in the ads. Their technical name is ELISA or EIA (Enzyme-linked Immuno-sorbant Assay). They are antibody tests. The tests contain proteins that react with antibodies in your blood.
False Positives
In the U.S., you're tested with an ELISA first. If your blood reacts, you'll be tested again, with another ELISA. Why is the second more accurate than the first? That's just the protocol. If you have a reaction on the second ELISA, you'll be confirmed with a third antibody test, called the Western Blot. But that's here in America. In some countries, one ELISA is all you get.
It is precisely because HIV tests are antibody tests that they produce so many false-positive results. All antibodies tend to cross-react. We produce anti-bodies all the time, in response to stress, malnutrition, illness, drug use, vaccination, foods we eat, a cut, a cold, even pregnancy. These antibodies are known to make HIV tests come up as positive.
The medical literature lists dozens of reasons for positive HIV test results: "transfusions, transplantation, or pregnancy, autoimmune disorders, malignancies, alcoholic liver disease, or for reasons that are unclear..." (Archives of Family Medicine. Sept/Oct. 2000).
"[L]iver diseases, parenteral substance abuse, hemodialysis, or vaccinations for hepatitis B, rabies, or influenza..." (Archives of Internal Medicine, August 2000).
The same is true for the confirmatory test the Western Blot. Causes of indeterminate Western Blots include: "lymphoma, multiple sclerosis, injection drug use, liver disease, or autoimmune disorders. Also, there appear to be healthy individuals with antibodies that cross-react...." (ibid).
Pregnancy is consistently listed as a cause of positive test results, even by the test manufacturers." [False positives can be caused by] prior pregnancy, blood transfusions...and other potential nonspecific reactions." (Vironostika HIV Test, 2003).
Inflated Africa Numbers
This is significant in Africa, because HIV estimates for African nations are drawn almost exclusively from testing done on groups of pregnant women.
In Zimbabwe last year, the rate of HIV infection among young women decreased remarkably, from 32.5 to 6 percent. A drop of 81 percent overnight. UNICEF's Swaziland representative, Dr. Alan Brody, told the press that, "The problem is that all the sero-surveillance data came from pregnant women, and estimates for other demographics was based on that." (PLUS News, August, 2004).
Flawed Samples
When these pregnant young women are tested, they're often tested for other illnesses, like syphilis, at the same time. There's no concern for cross-reactivity or false-positives in this group, and no repeat testing. One ELISA on one girl, and 32.5 percent of the population is suddenly HIV positive.
The June 20, 2004 Boston Globe reported "the current estimate of 40 million people living with the AIDS virus worldwide is inflated by 25 percent to 50 percent." It said that HIV estimates for entire countries have, for over a decade, been taken from "blood samples from pregnant women at prenatal clinics."
But numbers about "AIDS deaths, AIDS orphans, numbers of people needing antiretroviral treatment, and the average life expectancy" are all taken from that one test.
I've certainly never seen this in a VH1 ad.
At present there are about six-dozen reasons given in the literature why the tests come up positive. In fact, the medical literature states that there is simply no way of knowing if any HIV test is truly positive or negative:
"[F]alse-positive reactions have been observed with every single HIV-1 protein, recombinant or authentic." (Clinical Chemistry. 37; 1991). "Thus, it may be impossible to relate an antibody response specifically to HIV-1 infection." (Medicine International. 1988).
Ambiguous Results
And even if you believe the reaction is not a false positive, "the test does not indicate whether the person currently harbors the virus." (Science. November, 1999).
The test manufacturers state that after the antibody reaction occurs, the tests have to be "interpreted." There is no strict or clear definition of HIV positive or negative. There's just the antibody reaction. The reaction is colored by an enzyme, and read by a machine called a spectro-photometer.
The machine grades the reactions according to their strength (but not specificity), above and below a cut-off. If you test above the cut-off, you're positive; if you test below it, you're negative. So what determines the all-important cut-off? From The CDC's instructional material: "Establishing the cutoff value to define a positive test result from a negative one is somewhat arbitrary." (CDC, 2003)
GMCarter - 05 May 2005 10:32 GMT >Unreliable Tests This sounds like that idiot's Liam Scheff's rantings and ramblings. The guy wombles all over, picking a bit from 1988, throwing in a line here, misinterpreting data from a study there and comes up with another reason for wearing his aluminum hat.
George M. Carter
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