Medical Forum / Diseases and Disorders / AIDS / December 2004
Dissidents winning on every front. Look at the press this week.
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PaulKing - 15 Dec 2004 03:22 GMT From Fox News and the BBC running the dissident story on Glaxco crimes against children in New York to the Associated Press story confirming that the authorities had lied about HAART side effects to the LA Weekly review praising the new dissident film, The Other Side of AIDS........only one conclusion is possible.
We are winning the battle and the tide is turning fast.
No pathetic smear article can hide that fact.
PaulKing - 15 Dec 2004 03:49 GMT "President Bush’s recent trip to Africa has highlighted the need for increased funding for development assistance and truly free trade, yet development assistance to Africa remains stagnant, minus money for AIDS it is actually decreasing."
WHAT GREAT NEWS.
PaulKing - 15 Dec 2004 04:03 GMT CUTTING THE RIBBON. No red carpet for the ultimate AIDS symbol? Red ribbon, red ribbon, where art thou?
By Celia Farber (New York Press cover story)
We were watching the Golden Globe Awards, and I suddenly noticed something strange. The stars had no red ribbons on their lapels. None of them–not even Meryl Streep, not even while she was accepting her award for Angels in America.
Interesting.
The iconic red ribbon was created in 1991 by a group of artists who formed an organization called Visual AIDS. The ribbon was meant to symbolize "solidarity and tolerance with those often discriminated by the public–the people living with HIV and AIDS."
Here are the four stated meanings of the color red, which you can find on hundreds of AIDS websites around the world:
Red like love, as a symbol of passion and tolerance towards those affected.
Red like blood, representing the pain caused by the many people that died of AIDS.
Red like the anger about the helplessness by which we are facing a disease for which there is still no chance for a cure.
Red as a warning not to carelessly ignore one of the biggest problems of our time.
A noose, you might say, that strangles any emotional response other than those dictated in this covenant. Should you stray beyond these boundaries of prescripted emotion, you’ll be shamed, punished, vilified and driven out of polite society on a rail. Just look at the language–it’s all there. What begins unconvincingly with "love" and "tolerance" soon becomes "blood," "pain," "anger" and finally "a warning."
I respect the millions of people who have used the ribbon simply to express empathy with suffering. But the ribbon, like the slogan "Silence=Death," has fascist implications. It has long reigned as the official, global symbol not of AIDS itself, but of the dominant, immutable ideology within AIDS. The core mandate of this ideology has been to enforce and brand AIDS as the disease of all time, the disease without scope, the disease that must rule over every mind whether awake or asleep, from here to Cape Town to Bombay, and for the rest of time. It would be the disease that no leader, no politician, really no living person, could ever "care" about as much as the ribbon demands, because the ribbon is insatiable.
Since 1980, American taxpayers have spent a total of $132.4 billion on a blitzkreig of virtually fruitless research into the very ordinary nine kilobase retrovirus, HIV, widely believed to cause the vast range of symptoms gathered together as AIDS. (Widely believed, that is, by those in its employment. Hundreds of virologists, biochemists and other scientists believe nothing of the kind, and have stated their opposition vocally into the small black hole reserved for people like them, that sits about 180 miles off the outer periphery of "responsible journalism.") That is more than six times the amount NASA has spent putting every man it has thus far put on the moon, and yet we haven’t saved one AIDS patient. Ask amFAR.
The first thing you will be asked to obliterate when you contemplate AIDS is your sense of proportion. It is a religion, not a disease. But let’s leave aside profoundly disturbing questions about whether the scientific approach to AIDS has been linear and rational, if unproductive, as many believe, or ill-conceived, myopic and disastrous, as others believe. Let’s just look at the Red Ribbon and its curious sweep of the planet’s consciousness.
Ideological and religious symbols seek to replicate themselves as far and wide as possible. Every place where the symbol crops up, it is a sign that its belief system has triumphed. The symbol amalgamates ideas and responses, and short-circuits individual expression. It is a simplifier and a unifier. In the dictatorship of the AIDS proletariat, the red ribbon was the Lenin bust. It was mass-produced and distributed around the world–pinned on every lapel, stamped on every available surface, emblazoned on walls and windows and erected into giant statues. Nobody holds the copyright; it is a symbol of compassion, remember, so the magic of it is that everybody who wanted to show they "cared about AIDS" did their part–made and folded their own ribbons in their own countries, and distributed them with evangelical zeal. The ribbon, like red flags on May Day, was in profligate bloom whenever an AIDS movie premiered or an actor received an award for a stirring portrait of an AIDS victim. The flag of contemporary rightness. Purity. Tolerance.
The website of Red Ribbon Deutschland tells us that "Red Ribbons are folded manually by various volunteers throughout Germany. We have so many supporters on our list that we don’t need any additional help at this time" (emphasis theirs).
The website goes on to say that in addition to distributing the ribbons at AIDS events, they are besieged by requests for red ribbons by German citizens who want to "hand them out at their weddings and birthday celebrations"–by shop owners who want them available at the counter and companies who want them distributed to employees.
Like I said, it’s a symbol of purification, a means of purging guilt.
But guilt about what?
I watch the ups and downs of AIDS mania, searching, usually in vain, for signs that it is sobering up, coming to its senses, maybe even developing an interest in the objective reality outside the ever-protective propaganda bubble.
The ribbon made its debut into mass consciousness at the 1991 Tony Awards, for which Visual AIDS volunteers had sent letters and red ribbons to all attendees. "Unfortunately," as several of the ribbon sites phrase it, "Jeremy Irons was one of the very few celebrities wearing the Red Ribbon that night."
The campaign continued, and soon stars were sent letters by volunteers, imploring them to wear the ribbon at awards ceremonies. The rest is history. I vaguely recall one actor refusing to wear one a few years back. Was it Jack Nicholson?
Whoever it was, of course, was branded a callous homophobe. But the act of defiance signaled something important: The wish to preserve our inalienable human right to feel, respond, react as we ourselves decide to–not as cogs in a vast machinery that has codified the feelings for us and festooned us with its idealized emotions.
Why are they so maniacally controlling of our feelings about AIDS? And how have these ribbons in all their redness and rightness served to drain us of the very humanity they purport to impart?
Do we really need amFAR or Bono or Sharon Stone to tell us what sad means? What loss means? What death means?
I’ll tune in to the Oscars, if nothing else, to check for ribbons. And if they’re absent, it will mean that new borders are opening up through which vital discourse can at last take place on a disease long trapped in a hagiography that has made real science, i.e., real caring, impossible.
PaulKing - 15 Dec 2004 04:40 GMT AIDS Project Arizona closed its doors this week
Before AIDS Project Arizona closed its doors this week, the non-profit used about $20,000 from a charity-walk account to pay employees, forcing organizers to cancel the event. The money for the walk, scheduled for Nov. 7, came from event sponsors and walkers who pre-registered for the event. Arcelious Stephens, APAZ's board chairman, said members decided to use funds from both the APAZ bank account and AIDS Walk Arizona to make the agency's final payroll All but one of 22 APAZ employees received their full paychecks, he added. "The livelihoods of these people are very dependent on their paychecks," he said. "We had to make a moral judgment, an ethical judgment if you will." The Scottsdale-based Go Daddy Group, which specializes in Internet domain-name registrations, paid $20,000 to be the title sponsor for the walk, which raised money and awareness for HIV/AIDS. In a statement, company President Bob Parsons said, "We were extremely disappointed to learn both of the cancellation of this important event and of the misappropriation of the funds Go Daddy provided for the specific purpose of sponsoring the AIDS Walk." APAZ, the state's oldest HIV/AIDS support and advocacy group, provided education, testing and other services for more than 2,500 people infected or affected by HIV/AIDS. Stephens said the agency was forced to close, in part, because of a dispute with county health officials over getting reimbursed for services. He also said that APAZ would be getting less government money next year because of budget cuts, making it "unfeasible" for the agency to provide certain services. Its closure Monday caught Maricopa County health officials by surprise, even though they have known of financial and management problems at the non-profit organization for the past year. "Unfortunately, the financial situation that was bad a year ago has gotten worse and worse," said Dr. Jonathan Weisbuch, chief health officer for the Maricopa County Department of Public Health. The agency has a $700,000 contract this fiscal year with APAZ to provide services, including HIV testing, family support, food services, HIV education, and outreach to Black men and men having sex with men. APAZ's closing apparently wasn't a surprise to clients and their family members, said Brian Helander, executive director of Body Positive, another HIV/AIDS support group in the Valley. "Even though it's a sudden announcement, the buildup to this has been over some time. They (clients) have already made their way to other agencies. It's not a break-the-glass emergency," he said. Several other HIV/AIDS groups, such as Body Positive and Ebony House, provide similar services once provided by APAZ. "There will be no gaps in services. People will get what they need. People with HIV will be taken care of in every way," Helander said. In an open letter on the www.aidswalkaz.com Web site Tuesday, former AIDS Walk Arizona Director Scott Hummel said the event "has been canceled by the APAZ Board of Directors."
PaulKing - 15 Dec 2004 06:24 GMT AP: U.S. Officials Knew of AIDS Drug Risks
Mon Dec 13, 3:11 PM ET White House - AP
By JOHN SOLOMON, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - Weeks before President Bush (news - web sites) announced a plan to protect African babies from AIDS (news - web sites), top U.S. health officials were warned that research on the key drug was flawed and may have underreported thousands of severe reactions including deaths, government documents show.
AP Photo
AP Photo
Slideshow: HIV/AIDS
The 2002 warnings about the drug, nevirapine, were serious enough to suspend testing for more than a year, let Uganda's government know of the dangers and prompt the drug's maker to pull its request for permission to use the medicine to protect newborns in the United States.
But the National Institutes of Health (news - web sites), the government's premiere health research agency, chose not to inform the White House as it scrambled to keep its experts' concerns from scuttling the use of nevirapine in Africa as a cheap solution, according to documents obtained by The Associated Press.
"Everyone recognized the enormity that this decision could have on the worldwide use of nevirapine to interrupt mother-baby transmission," NIH's AIDS research chief, Dr. Edmund C. Tramont, reported March 14, 2002, to his boss, Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (news - web sites).
The documents show Tramont and other NIH officials dismissed the problems with the nevirapine research in Uganda as overblown and were slow to report safety concerns to the Food and Drug Administration (news - web sites).
NIH's nevirapine research in Uganda was so riddled with sloppy record keeping that NIH investigators couldn't be sure from patient records which mothers got the drug. Instead, they had to use blood samples to confirm doses, the documents show.
Less than a month after Bush announced a $500 million plan to push nevirapine across Africa to slow the AIDS epidemic, the Health and Human Services (news - web sites) Department sent a nine-page letter to Ugandan officials identifying violations of federal patient protection rules by NIH's research.
The NIH research "may have represented a failure to minimize risk to the subjects," the Office of Human Research Protections told Ugandan authorities in summer 2002.
Africa accounts for more than two-thirds of the world's AIDS cases, with 27 million infected, and the United States sought to help slow the disease's spread across the continent.
Nevertheless, NIH officials told AP they remain confident after re-reviewing the Uganda study and other research that nevirapine can be used safely in single doses by African mothers and children to prevent HIV (news - web sites) transmissions during birth. But they acknowledged their Uganda research failed to meet required U.S. standards.
As a result, NIH recently asked the National Academy of Sciences (news - web sites) to investigate its science in the case, and has spent millions in the last two years improving its safety monitoring and record keeping.
"I would say there are many lessons that we have learned from this review that will help us do our clinical research, both domestically and internationally, much better," said Dr. H. Clifford Lane, NIH's No. 2 infectious disease official.
One lesson derived from a closer review of the Uganda research is that even single doses of nevirapine can create instant resistance, meaning patients may not be able to use the drug or others in its class again when their AIDS worsens, Lane said.
"It was unexpected, and what it means is nevirapine probably shouldn't be a drug of first choice if other options are available," Lane said.
Lane said NIH officials were aware in spring 2002 about the impending White House announcement on nevirapine but did not tell presidential aides of the problems because they were confident, even before reviewing the Uganda research, that the underlying science was solid.
The White House — though unaware of the NIH concerns — also remains confident in Bush's $500 million plan in 2002 to send nevirapine to Africa. Bush approved $2.9 billion for global AIDS fighting next year.
"The president's mission is to try to stop the spread of AIDS in Africa and to come at it from a new angle, and that is what this is all about," spokesman Trent Duffy said.
Nevirapine is an antiretroviral drug marketed in the United States as Viramune that has been used since the 1990s to treat adult AIDS patients and is known to have potentially lethal effects like liver damage and severe rashes when taken over time.
In 1997, NIH began studying in Uganda whether it could be given safely in single doses to stop mother-to-baby transmissions. That research showed it could reduce transmission in as many as half the births.
But by early 2002, an NIH auditor, the agency's medical safety experts and the drug's maker all disclosed widespread problems about the U.S.-funded research in Uganda.
Boehringer Ingelheim, the Connecticut-based company that makes nevirapine, told NIH it identified at least one "critical compliance issue" that compromised the integrity of the study and more than four dozen issues it described as "serious" and "major."
Boehringer and NIH auditors cited concerns such as failing to get patients' consent about changes in the experiment, administering wrong doses and delays and underreporting of "fatal and life threatening" problems.
"It appeared likely, in fact, that many adverse events and perhaps a significant number of serious adverse events for both mother and infant may not have been collected or reported in a timely manner," Westat Corp. reported in March 2002. Westat is a professional medical auditing firm hired by NIH to visit and audit the Uganda site.
Westat reported there were 14 deaths not reported in the study database as of early 2002 and that the top two researchers in Uganda acknowledged "thousands" of bad reactions that weren't disclosed.
NIH said the subsequent review whittled that list down significantly, all deaths were eventually recorded and the majority of bad reactions are believed to have been caused by the poor health of patients, not the single dose of nevirapine. But they conceded it was incumbent on a U.S. research project to fully and quickly disclose them.
Officials said the problems began when NIH converted the research from determining the drug's usefulness to supporting FDA (news - web sites) approval for the drug. Paperwork in Uganda wasn't kept to the FDA standards, they said.
"We may not have reported exhaustively, but we reported all serious side effects," said Professor Francis Mmiro, a lead doctor in the Uganda study. "What you may call a serious side effect in the U.S. is not a serious side effect in Kampala."
NIH officials reviewed the bad news in early March 2002.
Meeting minutes, written in shorthand, raised broad concerns: Half the babies in the study were also enrolled in a vitamin A study that could have affected the outcome, and medical staff running the trials didn't follow procedures for divulging serious adverse events (SAEs).
"No mtg minutes, no training doc(umentation), site used their own criteria for grading SAEs. No lab normal values & serious underreporting of SAEs," the minutes stated.
The minutes quote an NIH official who visited Uganda as saying, "The site staff doesn't know what they don't know."
But Tramont, the AIDS research chief, and other top NIH officials repeatedly dismissed the concerns as preliminary or overblown, and sought to salvage the flawed research's underlying conclusions rather than start over.
"There is presently no evidence that the study's scientific results are invalid," said a report Tramont sent to his staff less than two weeks after getting the March 2002 Westat audit.
In January 2002, Boehringer sent NIH an early copy of its report. But the drug maker, fearing publicity about the report might destroy its chance to get the FDA approval of the drug for domestic use, asked NIH to destroy it before FDA regulators could learn about it.
"Sensitive information. Asked for it to be destroyed when audit is upon us," NIH official Mary Anne Luzar wrote on the cover page of Boehringer's report.
Boehringer says it never requested the document be destroyed, saying "our actions throughout the study evaluation were proactive and forthcoming."
Lane said the request to destroy the report was inappropriate and NIH never complied. But he conceded his agency inappropriately kept the audit from FDA for weeks, saying, "It shouldn't have happened that way."
NIH at first sought to postpone the FDA review of nevirapine, then top NIH and FDA officials arranged for the drug maker to pull its U.S. application rather than risk a public rejection that might scare African countries looking for U.S. guidance on the drug.
Unaware of the internal NIH concerns, Bush announced in June 2002 a $500 million effort to fight the spread of AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean. The plan's centerpiece was nevirapine.
"This major commitment of my government to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission is the first of this scale by any government, anywhere," Bush said in a Rose Garden announcement. The White House hoped the initiative would reach up to 1 million women a year and cut mother-to-child transmission of HIV by up to 40 percent.
Two years later, after hundreds of thousands of doses of nevirapine have been distributed to African mothers and children, the FDA has recommended NIH stop using the drug with certain patients. It also has demanded stronger warnings to doctors and patients about possible lethal liver damage and rashes in patients who take nevirapine for longer periods of time.
African health officials are having second thoughts. South African officials in July recommended ending the single-use treatment because of the new concerns about drug resistance.
African doctors said they weren't aware of the full extent of NIH's concerns but feel comfortable — at least until better options emerge — administering it in single doses to AIDS-sickened mothers who have few other choices to protect newborns.
"It's not ideal, but it works," said Dr. Ashraf Coovadia of Coronation Mother and Child Hospital in Johannesburg, South Africa. Without it, "many, many more babies would be born with HIV."
Boehringer Ingelheim said it has donated enough doses to treat more than 411,000 mothers and infants in Africa, and self disclosed the problems it found with the Uganda research. But it says it has research from other locations, like Thailand and South Africa, showing single dose usage at birth is safe and effective.
"The bottom line is there were these procedural issues, such as the speed of reporting adverse events, and the like. But the important scientific data was intact, and found to be valid," said Dr. Patrick Robinson, a top Boehringer AIDS specialist.
Still, the German-owned company no longer is seeking FDA permission to use nevirapine for protecting U.S. infants because better treatments have emerged, he said.
___
AP reporter Alexandra Zavis in Johannesburg, South Africa, contributed to this story.
On the Net:
Documents gathered by AP for this story are available at: http://wid.ap.org/nevirapine1.html
National Institutes of Health: http://www.nih.gov
Boehringer Ingelheim: http://www.boehringer-ingelheim.com
Mon Dec 13, 3:11 PM ET White House - AP
By JOHN SOLOMON, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - Weeks before President Bush (news - web sites) announced a plan to protect African babies from AIDS (news - web sites), top U.S. health officials were warned that research on the key drug was flawed and may have underreported thousands of severe reactions including deaths, government documents show.
AP Photo
AP Photo
Slideshow: HIV/AIDS
The 2002 warnings about the drug, nevirapine, were serious enough to suspend testing for more than a year, let Uganda's government know of the dangers and prompt the drug's maker to pull its request for permission to use the medicine to protect newborns in the United States.
But the National Institutes of Health (news - web sites), the government's premiere health research agency, chose not to inform the White House as it scrambled to keep its experts' concerns from scuttling the use of nevirapine in Africa as a cheap solution, according to documents obtained by The Associated Press.
"Everyone recognized the enormity that this decision could have on the worldwide use of nevirapine to interrupt mother-baby transmission," NIH's AIDS research chief, Dr. Edmund C. Tramont, reported March 14, 2002, to his boss, Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (news - web sites).
The documents show Tramont and other NIH officials dismissed the problems with the nevirapine research in Uganda as overblown and were slow to report safety concerns to the Food and Drug Administration (news - web sites).
NIH's nevirapine research in Uganda was so riddled with sloppy record keeping that NIH investigators couldn't be sure from patient records which mothers got the drug. Instead, they had to use blood samples to confirm doses, the documents show.
Less than a month after Bush announced a $500 million plan to push nevirapine across Africa to slow the AIDS epidemic, the Health and Human Services (news - web sites) Department sent a nine-page letter to Ugandan officials identifying violations of federal patient protection rules by NIH's research.
The NIH research "may have represented a failure to minimize risk to the subjects," the Office of Human Research Protections told Ugandan authorities in summer 2002.
Africa accounts for more than two-thirds of the world's AIDS cases, with 27 million infected, and the United States sought to help slow the disease's spread across the continent.
Nevertheless, NIH officials told AP they remain confident after re-reviewing the Uganda study and other research that nevirapine can be used safely in single doses by African mothers and children to prevent HIV (news - web sites) transmissions during birth. But they acknowledged their Uganda research failed to meet required U.S. standards.
As a result, NIH recently asked the National Academy of Sciences (news - web sites) to investigate its science in the case, and has spent millions in the last two years improving its safety monitoring and record keeping.
"I would say there are many lessons that we have learned from this review that will help us do our clinical research, both domestically and internationally, much better," said Dr. H. Clifford Lane, NIH's No. 2 infectious disease official.
One lesson derived from a closer review of the Uganda research is that even single doses of nevirapine can create instant resistance, meaning patients may not be able to use the drug or others in its class again when their AIDS worsens, Lane said.
"It was unexpected, and what it means is nevirapine probably shouldn't be a drug of first choice if other options are available," Lane said.
Lane said NIH officials were aware in spring 2002 about the impending White House announcement on nevirapine but did not tell presidential aides of the problems because they were confident, even before reviewing the Uganda research, that the underlying science was solid.
The White House — though unaware of the NIH concerns — also remains confident in Bush's $500 million plan in 2002 to send nevirapine to Africa. Bush approved $2.9 billion for global AIDS fighting next year.
"The president's mission is to try to stop the spread of AIDS in Africa and to come at it from a new angle, and that is what this is all about," spokesman Trent Duffy said.
Nevirapine is an antiretroviral drug marketed in the United States as Viramune that has been used since the 1990s to treat adult AIDS patients and is known to have potentially lethal effects like liver damage and severe rashes when taken over time.
In 1997, NIH began studying in Uganda whether it could be given safely in single doses to stop mother-to-baby transmissions. That research showed it could reduce transmission in as many as half the births.
But by early 2002, an NIH auditor, the agency's medical safety experts and the drug's maker all disclosed widespread problems about the U.S.-funded research in Uganda.
Boehringer Ingelheim, the Connecticut-based company that makes nevirapine, told NIH it identified at least one "critical compliance issue" that compromised the integrity of the study and more than four dozen issues it described as "serious" and "major."
Boehringer and NIH auditors cited concerns such as failing to get patients' consent about changes in the experiment, administering wrong doses and delays and underreporting of "fatal and life threatening" problems.
"It appeared likely, in fact, that many adverse events and perhaps a significant number of serious adverse events for both mother and infant may not have been collected or reported in a timely manner," Westat Corp. reported in March 2002. Westat is a professional medical auditing firm hired by NIH to visit and audit the Uganda site.
Westat reported there were 14 deaths not reported in the study database as of early 2002 and that the top two researchers in Uganda acknowledged "thousands" of bad reactions that weren't disclosed.
NIH said the subsequent review whittled that list down significantly, all deaths were eventually recorded and the majority of bad reactions are believed to have been caused by the poor health of patients, not the single dose of nevirapine. But they conceded it was incumbent on a U.S. research project to fully and quickly disclose them.
Officials said the problems began when NIH converted the research from determining the drug's usefulness to supporting FDA (news - web sites) approval for the drug. Paperwork in Uganda wasn't kept to the FDA standards, they said.
"We may not have reported exhaustively, but we reported all serious side effects," said Professor Francis Mmiro, a lead doctor in the Uganda study. "What you may call a serious side effect in the U.S. is not a serious side effect in Kampala."
NIH officials reviewed the bad news in early March 2002.
Meeting minutes, written in shorthand, raised broad concerns: Half the babies in the study were also enrolled in a vitamin A study that could have affected the outcome, and medical staff running the trials didn't follow procedures for divulging serious adverse events (SAEs).
"No mtg minutes, no training doc(umentation), site used their own criteria for grading SAEs. No lab normal values & serious underreporting of SAEs," the minutes stated.
The minutes quote an NIH official who visited Uganda as saying, "The site staff doesn't know what they don't know."
But Tramont, the AIDS research chief, and other top NIH officials repeatedly dismissed the concerns as preliminary or overblown, and sought to salvage the flawed research's underlying conclusions rather than start over.
"There is presently no evidence that the study's scientific results are invalid," said a report Tramont sent to his staff less than two weeks after getting the March 2002 Westat audit.
In January 2002, Boehringer sent NIH an early copy of its report. But the drug maker, fearing publicity about the report might destroy its chance to get the FDA approval of the drug for domestic use, asked NIH to destroy it before FDA regulators could learn about it.
"Sensitive information. Asked for it to be destroyed when audit is upon us," NIH official Mary Anne Luzar wrote on the cover page of Boehringer's report.
Boehringer says it never requested the document be destroyed, saying "our actions throughout the study evaluation were proactive and forthcoming."
Lane said the request to destroy the report was inappropriate and NIH never complied. But he conceded his agency inappropriately kept the audit from FDA for weeks, saying, "It shouldn't have happened that way."
NIH at first sought to postpone the FDA review of nevirapine, then top NIH and FDA officials arranged for the drug maker to pull its U.S. application rather than risk a public rejection that might scare African countries looking for U.S. guidance on the drug.
Unaware of the internal NIH concerns, Bush announced in June 2002 a $500 million effort to fight the spread of AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean. The plan's centerpiece was nevirapine.
"This major commitment of my government to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission is the first of this scale by any government, anywhere," Bush said in a Rose Garden announcement. The White House hoped the initiative would reach up to 1 million women a year and cut mother-to-child transmission of HIV by up to 40 percent.
Two years later, after hundreds of thousands of doses of nevirapine have been distributed to African mothers and children, the FDA has recommended NIH stop using the drug with certain patients. It also has demanded stronger warnings to doctors and patients about possible lethal liver damage and rashes in patients who take nevirapine for longer periods of time.
African health officials are having second thoughts. South African officials in July recommended ending the single-use treatment because of the new concerns about drug resistance.
African doctors said they weren't aware of the full extent of NIH's concerns but feel comfortable — at least until better options emerge — administering it in single doses to AIDS-sickened mothers who have few other choices to protect newborns.
"It's not ideal, but it works," said Dr. Ashraf Coovadia of Coronation Mother and Child Hospital in Johannesburg, South Africa. Without it, "many, many more babies would be born with HIV."
Boehringer Ingelheim said it has donated enough doses to treat more than 411,000 mothers and infants in Africa, and self disclosed the problems it found with the Uganda research. But it says it has research from other locations, like Thailand and South Africa, showing single dose usage at birth is safe and effective.
"The bottom line is there were these procedural issues, such as the speed of reporting adverse events, and the like. But the important scientific data was intact, and found to be valid," said Dr. Patrick Robinson, a top Boehringer AIDS specialist.
Still, the German-owned company no longer is seeking FDA permission to use nevirapine for protecting U.S. infants because better treatments have emerged, he said.
___
AP reporter Alexandra Zavis in Johannesburg, South Africa, contributed to this story.
On the Net:
Documents gathered by AP for this story are available at: http://wid.ap.org/nevirapine1.html
National Institutes of Health: http://www.nih.gov
Boehringer Ingelheim: http://www.boehringer-ingelheim.com
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